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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS A LEGAL FIELD: 
AN INQUIRY IN LEGAL TAXONOMY 
 
Todd S. Aagaard 
 
This Article examines the classification of the law into legal fields, 
first generally and then by specific examination of the field of 
environmental law.  We classify the law into fields to find and to create 
patterns, which render the law coherent and understandable.  A legal field is 
a group of situations unified by a pattern or set of patterns that is both 
common and distinctive to the field.  We can conceptualize a legal field as 
the interaction of four underlying constitutive dimensions of the field:  (1) a 
factual context that gives rise to (2) certain policy tradeoffs, which are in 
turn resolved by (3) the application of values and interests to produce 
(4) legal doctrine.  An organizational framework for a field identifies the 
field’s common and distinctive patterns, which may arise in any of these 
underlying constitutive dimensions. 
The second part of the Article applies this general analytical 
approach to the field of environmental law, proposing a framework for 
understanding environmental law as a field of legal study.  Two core factual 
characteristics of environmental problems are, in combination, both 
common and distinct to environmental law:  physical public resources and 
pervasive interrelatedness.  Numerous use demands are placed on 
environmental resources, creating conflicts.  These use conflicts define the 
policy tradeoffs that frame environmental lawmaking, forming the basis for 
a use-conflict framework for conceptualizing environmental lawmaking.  A 
use-conflict framework for environmental lawmaking carries significant 
analytical advantages over other models for conceptualizing environmental 
law as a legal field. 
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 What makes an area of law a legal field?  What distinguishes areas 
of law we regard as legal fields from the oft-cited joke of the “Law of the 
Horse”?1  What do we aim to accomplish with legal taxonomy, by 
classifying the law into more specific sub-disciplines?  What kind of 
taxonomical scheme advances those objectives?  What characteristics must 
an area of law exhibit to advance those aims and to establish its validity as a 
legal field? 
This Article addresses these questions, both generally and by 
specific examination of the field of environmental law.  Environmental 
law’s existential angst provides fertile ground for considering questions of 
legal taxonomy.  There is no doubt that something we call environmental 
law exists.  We are in the vicinity of the fortieth anniversary of the birth of 
modern environmental law in the United States.2  Over that period, 
environmental law has matured considerably and has reached a certain level 
of stability.3  There seems little doubt that environmental law is now a 
permanent fixture in the law.  On the other hand, the thrill of the 
environmental legal revolution of the 1970s has long since faded, the 
content of environmental law has complexified dramatically over time, and 
there has arisen a marked frustration with environmental law’s incoherence.  
Environmental law is bemoaned, even among its advocates, as highly 
                                                 
1 According to one telling of the joke, the Law of the Horse would consist of Contracting 
for a Horse, Owning a Horse, Torts by a Horse, and Litigation Over a Horse.  Darian M. 
Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback:  Reflections on the 
Organization of Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 71 (2008) (quoting Harold Hongju Koh, Is 
There a “New” New Haven School of International Law?, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 572 
n.85 (2007)); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207 (1996) (“Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal 
with people kicked by horses; still more deal with the licensing and racing of horses, or 
with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with prizes at horse shows.”).  For additional 
references to, and discussion of, the “Law of the Horse,” see Easterbrook, supra, at 207, 
214 (attributing the origin of the phrase to Karl Llewellyn); Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health 
Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365, 368 (2006); Henry 
T. Greely, Some Thoughts on Academic Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 404-
05 (2006); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:  What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999). 
2 The first major federal environmental case, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. 
Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), was decided in 1965.  The first 
modern federal environmental statute, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f, was signed into law on January 1, 1970.  See also RICHARD J. 
LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 48 (2004) (noting that 1970 saw, in 
addition to signing of NEPA, the creation of the President’s Council on Environmental 
Quality, the first nationwide celebration of Earth Day, the creation of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the passage of the Clean Air Act’s demanding and 
uncompromising air pollution control program”). 
3 See James L. Huffman, The Past and Future of Environmental Law, 30 ENVTL. L. 23, 23 
(2005). 
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fragmented4 and unduly complicated.5  There is a strong sense that 
environmental law needs an overall vision or descriptive framework that 
works to cohere the subject matter.6 
 The project of attempting to identify such a unifying framework for 
environmental law poses certain questions:  What is environmental law?  
When we describe a factual pattern, case, or rule as arising within 
environmental law, what associations do we mean to convey by that 
designation?  What, if anything, unifies environmental law?  Is 
environmental law a legal field, or just an amalgamation of laws arranged 
under a general subject matter?  Does environmental law function 
distinctively?  What differentiates environmental law from other legal 
fields? 
Addressing such questions, whether in environmental law or in 
some other area, is not just academic rumination.  Classification is inherent 
and fundamental to the operation of law.  Justice requires consistency.7  
Legal classifications enable consistency by designating categories of similar 
situations to which a common set of principles apply.  The category into 
which a situation is assigned thus may determine how the law applies to the 
situation.8  The law works through categories, and one of the more 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Uwe M. Erling, Approaches To Integrated Pollution Control in the United 
States and the European Union, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11 (2001); Daniel A. Farber, 
Foreword, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 383, 386 (2005); Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of 
Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 
661, 662 (2008); Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing the EPA to 
Conform with the New American Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 29 (1998); 
Christine A. Klein, Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under the Antiquities Act, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 1333, 1338 n.22 (2002); Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and 
the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 190 (1997). 
5 DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 1 (1999); Peter Manus, Our Environmental 
Rebels: An Average American Law Professor's Perspective on Environmental Advocacy, 
40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 499, 516 (2006); Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law in the Law 
Schools:  What We Teach and How We Feel About It, 19 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10,251 (1989); 
David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 
621, 625 (1994). 
6 See Daniel A. Farber, Foreword, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 383, 387 (2005) (“But without any 
overall vision of the field, it is unclear how either agencies or courts can produce a halfway 
coherent approach to environmental law.”); Westbrook, supra note 5, at 621 
(“[E]nvironmental law is not a discipline, because it lacks the professional consensus on a 
coherent internal organization of materials a discipline requires.”). 
7 See, e.g., Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 391 
(1983); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 293-94 (1970). 
8 To take just one example, important innovations during the 1970s in the legal rules that 
apply to residential property leasing were justified by virtue of a reassignment of 
residential leasing from the category of traditional property law to contract law.  See, e.g., 
Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (rejecting 
the application of “old common law doctrines” of “real property transactions” and relying 
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important types of categories employed in the law are legal fields.  We 
designate legal fields—environmental law, labor law, criminal law—on the 
premise that those designations identify something important about how the 
law operates. 
Thinking about what it means to designate a field of law and what is 
required for an area of law to be a legal field therefore carries the promise 
of improving our understanding of how the law functions.  An improved 
understanding of the law, in turn, may facilitate efforts to improve the law.  
When we understand how the law functions, we are better able to identify 
situations in which the law does not promote our desired objectives and to 
posit alternative approaches that may be more effective.9  Constructing an 
analytical framework that brings together an area of law as varied and 
complex as environmental law will not itself resolve the recurring conflicts 
and difficulties that stymie environmental lawmaking, but it may well 
expose those conflicts and difficulties in a new light and help to frame the 
decisions facing legislatures, agencies, and courts, thereby facilitating more 
effective lawmaking. 
This Article’s examination of legal taxonomy proceeds in two Parts.  
Part I addresses the general question of what makes an area of law a legal 
field.  We classify the law into fields to find and to create patterns, which 
render the law coherent and understandable.  A legal field is a group of 
situations unified by a pattern or set of patterns that is both common and 
distinctive to the field.  We can conceptualize a legal field as the interaction 
of four underlying constitutive dimensions of the field:  (1) a factual context 
that gives rise to (2) certain policy tradeoffs, which are in turn resolved by 
(3) the application of values and interests to produce (4) legal doctrine.  An 
organizational framework for a field identifies the field’s common and 
distinctive patterns, which may arise in any of these underlying constitutive 
dimensions.  The more that common and distinctive features predominate 
within the field, the more useful the field is likely to be as an analytical 
category.  In addition, ideally a legal field also has trans-substantive 
implications that extend beyond the field. 
                                                                                                                            
on contract principles to hold that a warranty of habitability should be applied into urban 
residential leases); Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767, 771, 773 (N.J. 1977) (rejecting the 
application of “principles of property law” and relying on contract principles to hold that a 
landlord has a duty to mitigate damages where it attempts to recover rent due from a 
defaulting tenant). 
9 Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three 
Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1070 (2008) (contending that the authors’ “three-
dimensional view” of property law “leads to a richer and more coherent view of the field” 
that can enable “scholars and lawmakers . . . to tailor better solutions to current and future 
property problems”). 
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Part II applies this general approach to the field of environmental 
law, proposing a framework for understanding environmental law as a field 
of legal study.  Part II begins by examining and critiquing two prominent 
prior efforts to explain environmental law as a coherent legal field.10  It 
argues that these efforts ultimately fail, primarily because their frameworks 
are unduly focused on environmentalism, which renders their 
characterizations of environmental law incomplete, rather than on 
identifying a pattern of features that are common and distinctive to 
environmental law.   
Part II then proceeds to set forth a superior organizational 
framework for environmental law, rooted in the constitutive dimensions of 
the field.  It argues that environmental problems—the factual context of 
environmental lawmaking—involve two core factual characteristics that are, 
in combination, both common and distinct to environmental law:  physical 
public resources and pervasive interrelatedness.  Numerous use demands 
are placed on these environmental resources, creating conflicts.  These use 
conflicts define the policy tradeoffs that frame environmental lawmaking, 
forming the basis for a use-conflict framework for conceptualizing 
environmental lawmaking.  These use conflicts derive from the specific 
factual context of the decision at issue, however, and cannot be 
meaningfully generalized into abstractions.  For this reason, the 
environmental law doctrine that is produced from the resolution of 
environmental use conflicts does not fit a clear, general pattern.  There are 
no core principles that unify all of substantive environmental law doctrine.  
Despite the absence of such principles, however, the analytical framework 
set forth in this Article, which emphasizes the role of use conflicts in 
environmental lawmaking, and the generation of use conflicts through 
competition among pervasively interrelated uses of physical public 
resources, meaningfully coheres the field of environmental law. 
I.  WHAT MAKES AN AREA OF LAW A LEGAL FIELD? 
A.  Legal Taxonomy and Legal Fields 
We organize the law into distinct fields as a form of legal taxonomy, 
on the premise that such classification will facilitate an improved 
                                                 
10 A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE ENVTL. 
L. 213 (2004); Westbrook, supra note 5. 
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understanding of the law.11  As Emily Sherwin has observed, significant 
benefits can result from a useful categorization of the law: 
[O]rganization of law into categories facilitate[s] legal 
analysis and communication of legal ideas. . . . [A] 
comprehensive formal classification of law provides a 
vocabulary and grammar that can make law more accessible 
and understandable to those who must use and apply it.  It 
assembles legal materials in a way that allows observers to 
view the law as a whole. This in turn makes it easier for 
lawyers to argue effectively about the normative aspects of 
law, for judges to explain their decisions, and for actors to 
coordinate their activities in response to law.12 
                                                 
11 See Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 305, 306 (2000) (“Putting information in context gives the researcher a 
powerful tool for understanding legal information.”); Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law:  
Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 5 (1997) 
(“Taxonomy . . . provides the intellectual framework of the law and it makes the law’s 
complexity more manageable.”); Linda Silberman, Transnational Litigation:  Is There a 
“Field”?  A Tribute to Hal Maier, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1427, 1430-32 (2006) 
(“[T]ransnational litigation has become a field because the discrete pieces can only be 
understood in relation to each other and to the whole . . . .”); id. at 1431 (“The study of 
transnational litigation contains interrelated elements that must be brought together in order 
to understand and appreciate any one of them.”); Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 
50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 243 (2000) (“Gaining knowledge of a subject is largely a matter 
of learning how to classify the subject and its constituent elements.”); id. at 244 (“We draw 
classifications in law not just for the sake of classifying but because classifying rules, 
cases, and so on is a large part of what acquiring legal knowledge means.”); Daniel J. 
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 484 (2006) (contending that a 
good taxonomy “is not simply an attempt to catalog existing laws,” but advances our 
understanding of the area of the law and thereby “provide[s] a useful framework for its 
future development”); see also GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING 
THINGS OUT:  CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 1 (1999) (“To classify is human.”); 
1 ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW xxxi-ii (Peter Birks, ed., 2000) (“The search for order is 
indistinguishable from the search for knowledge.”).  But see Roscoe Pound, Classification 
of Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 933, 938 (1924) (“[W]e must renounce extravagant expectations 
as to what may be accomplished through classification of law. . . . For I doubt whether a 
classification is possible that will do anything more than classify.”). 
12 Emily Sherwin, Legal Positivism and the Taxonomy of Private Law, in STRUCTURE AND 
JUSTIFICATION IN PRIVATE LAW:  ESSAYS FOR PETER BIRKS 103, 119 (Charles Rickett & 
Ross Grantham, eds., 2008); see also Mattei, supra note 11, at 6 (“Taxonomy plays an 
important role in transferring knowledge from one area of the law to another.”); Smith, 
supra note 11, at 244 (“Classifying a particular decision . . . is a claim about the meaning of 
the decision, as well as about how the decision should be applied in the future. To make 
good decisions courts need to distinguish like from unlike: to understand the law scholars 
need to do the same thing. When lawyers and scholars argue about how a case should be 
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Not every legal categorization, however, necessarily produces such 
benefits, and there are an innumerable number of theoretically available 
classifications from which to choose.  Any particular situation that arises in 
the law potentially can be classified into numerous different categories.  For 
example, an injury in the workplace could be characterized as a matter of, 
among other subject matter categories, labor law, employment law, 
occupational safety and health law, tort law, criminal law, federal law, state 
law, common law, and statutory law.  Each subject matter category, in turn, 
can be defined and characterized in numerous different ways—that is, there 
are many possible understandings of what it means to fall within the 
categories of tort law, employment law, and so forth.  The initial task of the 
legal taxonomer, therefore, is to find, among the immense variety of 
categorizations that theoretically can be employed to classify the law, those 
categorizations that yield the benefits Sherwin notes. 
Classification systems operate by employing an organizational 
framework to differentiate among the constituent elements being organized, 
determining which elements fall within which categories.  A classification 
is useful when the organizational framework reflects patterns that reveal 
something important to us about the materials being classified.13  If a 
classification system is helpful, applying the organizational framework 
differentiates among the elements in a manner that signals salient 
similarities and differences, bringing some degree of coherence to an 
otherwise undifferentiated mass.14   
Thus, the goal of legal taxonomy is to identify significant patterns in 
the law.  Which patterns are significant, and therefore worthy of 
identification, may depend on the specific objective of the classification.15  
In general, however, we would expect a pattern to be significant and worthy 
of identification if it is legally relevant—that is, if it affects the application 
of the law. 
                                                                                                                            
decided, or about the meaning of a particular rule, they are in large part arguing about how 
to classify the case or the rule.”). 
13 Elhauge, supra note 1, at 370 (“[D]o we gain insights from thinking as a group about the 
set of legal materials grouped under this rubric?”). 
14 See Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 674 
(1989) (“Classification is designed to reduce the complexity of complex analysis and to 
highlight similarities and differences among the objects classified.”); Kenneth R. Richards, 
Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 221, 
232 (2000) (“A useful taxonomy . . . inform[s] the user about the important similarities and 
differences among the various items in the classification. . . . Taxonomy generally employs 
an organizing principle to differentiate among the elements of the classification.”). 
15 Cf. ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW, supra note 11, at xliii (“different classifications simply 
answer different questions”). 
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Not all classifications of the law and legal taxonomy look to 
categorize the law into legal fields.  West Publishing Company’s American 
Digest System, for example, sorts legal issues into more than 400 
alphabetically arranged topic fields.16  As to the practice, teaching, study, 
and deciding of law, however, legal fields are probably the most important 
classification of the law.  The designation of a situation as falling within, or 
outside of, a particular legal field often carries powerful associations about 
how the situation should be understood and what legal rule should apply to 
it.17 
A field of law primarily functions as a frame of reference for 
understanding the set of situations that falls within the field, and to some 
extent for distinguishing situations within the field from those outside of the 
field.  The field’s organizational framework identifies the pattern or patterns 
that it associates with the field.18  The usefulness of the field varies 
depending on how well that pattern explains the various situations that the 
field encompasses.  This explanatory power, in turn, depends on several 
factors. 
First, a field’s explanatory power depends on the extent to which 
situations that arise within the field exhibit a recognizable pattern.  The 
stronger the pattern is, the more powerful the field is as a frame of reference 
for analyzing the situations it encompasses. 
Second, a field’s explanatory power depends on the simplicity of the 
pattern.  All else equal, the simpler the pattern is, the more powerful the 
field is as a means of explaining the situations it includes. 
                                                 
16 See WEST PUBLISHING CO., THE WEST KEY NUMBER SYSTEM:  ALPHABETICAL LIST OF 
DIGEST TOPICS 1, available at http://west.thomson.com/documentation/westlaw/wlawdoc/ 
wlres/keynmb06.pdf; see also Berring, supra note 11, at 309 (noting that the American 
Digest System “was built on a structure of topics and key numbers that allows for the 
detailed sorting of legal issues into neat categories and sub-categories” and “purports to 
describe every possible legal situation that can exist”). 
17 See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 662 (1987) (holding that state 
statute of limitations for tort actions applies to federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 
1981, because such actions sound in tort rather than contract); Hydro Conduit Corp. v. 
Kemble, 793 P.2d 855 (N.M. 1990) (applying state statute that conferred sovereign 
immunity over “actions based on contract,” and holding that an action seeking restitution 
for unjust enrichment fell within the category of contract for purposes of the statute); 
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Goodwin, 920 So.2d 427, 433 (Miss. 2006) (noting that choice-of-
law rules depend on the substantive area of law into which a case falls). 
18 See Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative Democracy in Health Care, 97 
GEO. L.J. 1, 17 (2008) (contending that the author’s proposed framework provides a “lens” 
for understanding her field of health law through “greater intellectual coherence”); see also 
id. at 4 (noting the author’s objective of developing “a more holistic and integrated 
conceptualization of health law”); id. at 19 (noting that the debate over the proper 
framework for health law “centers on how best to capture the uniqueness and coherence of 
health law”). 
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Third, a field’s explanatory power depends on the extent to which 
the pattern predominates within the field.  That is, of the various 
characteristics of the situations that arise within the field, the characteristics 
exhibiting the pattern predominate over other characteristics that do not.  
Where the characteristics that exhibit the pattern predominate over other 
characteristics, the pattern associated with the field will carry a greater 
power to explain situations within the field.   
Fourth, a field’s explanatory power depends on the extent to which a 
single pattern explains the various issues that arise within the field.  A 
framework that is helpful only in explaining certain issues that arise within 
a field is less helpful than a framework that explains many different issues 
within the field. 
Fifth, a field’s explanatory power depends on the breadth of the 
field; the scope of situations that arise within the field.  The more situations 
that can be viewed as arising within the field (and that exhibit the pattern 
that coheres the field), the broader the field and the more powerful the field 
is as a frame of reference.  The perfect framework for a perfectly coherent 
field, therefore, would fully explain various different issues that arise in a 
vast scope of situations with a simple organizing framework. 
B.  The Allure, and Hazard, of Coherence 
Taxonomy inevitably and inherently is, to some degree, a quest for 
coherence.  We employ taxonomy to identify a pattern that functionally 
coheres the field of study by adding some amount of logical order, 
consistency, and clarity.  This is the benefit of taxonomy, and it is an 
important benefit.  As Ann Althouse has observed, “Finding a scheme of 
coherence, a framework, really is the process of understanding. To merely 
observe that the field is chaotic, arcane, or incoherent is to decline the work 
of understanding. . . . [W]e must search for frameworks and coherencies as 
a necessary means of thinking about the subject.”19 
Coherence thus exerts a strong attractive force for the legal 
profession, inducing what Theodore Ruger has called a “coherence 
impulse.”20  Coherence has “dramatic potential for explanation and 
illumination”21 and “promises a vision of law that is unified, predictable and 
                                                 
19 Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel, 47 VAND. L. 
REV. 993, 1001 (1994). 
20 Theodore W. Ruger, Health Law’s Coherence Anxiety, 96 GEO. L.J. 625, 628 (2008); see 
also id. at 626 (referring to “coherence anxiety”). 
21 Id. at 630; see also id. (noting that “the academic preference for elegant and sparse 
theoretical coherence reflects a worthy intellectual goal of discernment and illumination”); 
 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS A LEGAL FIELD 10 
rational.”22  As a result, coherent fields are easier to learn, practice, decide, 
and theorize.23  Not coincidentally, the archetypal common-law fields that 
the legal profession intuitively regards as ideal legal fields, and that form 
the foundation for law school curricula, are often characterized by strongly 
coherent, even essentialist, models.24  For newer areas of law, coherence is 
perceived as a ticket to legitimacy as a legal field.25  As a result, much of 
the work of legal taxonomers has been to develop frameworks that bring 
coherence to an area of law.  In considering the coherence of a legal field, 
we can think of coherence as the strength, simplicity, and predominance of 
the field’s patterns.26 
Not all areas of law, however, are easily susceptible to a coherent 
account; some areas are just less coherent.  An area of law’s coherence 
depends on, among other things, the extent to which it exhibits strong, 
recognizable patterns,27 and several factors may influence the existence of 
such patterns. 
First, an area of law is more likely to exhibit consistency if its 
factual patterns have a great deal of commonality.  All else equal, the more 
similar the factual circumstances of situations that arise within the area, the 
more consistency we would expect in the law that governs those situations. 
                                                                                                                            
id. at 631 (“In this framework the cure for the malaise is the imposition of some grand 
unifying theme, the discovery of which is a central test of the field.”). 
22 Saiman, supra note 62, at 511; see also Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal 
Concepts:  Where Form Molds Substance, 75 CAL. L. REV. 15, 17 (1987) (ascribing to 
Christopher Columbus Langdell’s approach to studying the common law the belief that 
“[a]ll of the pieces of the puzzle could be assembled into a coherent picture”); Brian 
Langille & Patrick Macklem, The Political Economy of Fairness: Frank Iacobucci's 
Labour Law Jurisprudence, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 343, 343 (2007) (characterizing coherence 
as “a necessary precondition to principled decision making”). 
23 On the other hand, the legal profession may in some respects have an interest in 
maintaining at least some inscrutability in the law.  See Cisco General Counsel on State of 
Technology in the Law, available at http://blogs.cisco.com/news/comments/ 
cisco_general_counsel_on_state_of_technology_in_the_law/ (noting that, when “law gets 
standardized, it can be outsourced, co-sourced, integrated, aggregated, syndicated and 
shared,” empowering clients viz. a viz. their attorneys). 
24 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 11-22 (1984) 
25 See Ruger, supra note 20, at 630 (noting that “the intellectual pressure to achieve 
singular coherence is felt most acutely by newer fields aspiring to more established, if not 
canonical, status”); see also Steven Price, Book Review: Media Law in New Zealand, 36 
VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 665, 665 (2005) (tying recognition of the coherence of 
media law to “[t]he emergence of media law as a legitimate field of study”); Saiman, supra 
note 62, at 519 (“In a variety of ways, the legitimacy of restitution [as a legal field] is 
entirely bound up in the debate regarding the conceptual coherence of the proposed 
analytic category.”). 
26 See supra text following note 18 (identifying the strength, simplicity, and predominance 
of a field’s pattern as some of the factors that determine a field’s explanatory power). 
27 See supra text following note 18. 
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Second, areas of law in which a single value or interest has an 
influence are more likely to follow strong, recognizable patterns. 
The historical development of water law in the western United 
States illustrates the effect of both these factors.  Water law in the western 
United States developed as a relatively simple system for allocating 
irrigation water to local agriculture on a first-in-time priority basis.28  Over 
time, as the West developed, the factual context changed and became more 
varied and complex.  Development brought greater demand for water, 
leading to the construction of large-scale dams and aqueduct systems to 
store and deliver water.29  Development also brought a greater diversity of 
uses making claims to water resources, including industrial uses and 
municipal drinking water systems.30  In addition, increased environmental 
consciousness led to greater recognition of so-called “in-stream uses” that 
benefit the natural environment, such as fish populations.31  Together, the 
diversification of the factual context and the decline of resource exploitation 
as the overriding value of Western water law led to the development of new 
rules and principles that have rendered it more complicated and less 
coherent. 
Third, centralized and well-coordinated lawmaking processes are 
more likely to produce law that follows a strong pattern, and thus areas in 
which law is created by such processes are more likely to exhibit strong, 
recognizable patterns.  For example, whether an area of law is governed 
primarily by detailed legislation or by judicial decisions likely influences 
the coherence of the area.  In judicial lawmaking, the predominance of 
reasoning from precedent creates a strong influence favoring coherence.  
Judicial decisionmaking intentionally looks to cohere precedential materials 
and to produce a new decision consistent with that coherent understanding 
of precedent; the most fundamental path of judicial reasoning is to identify 
                                                 
28 See Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1873, 1898 (2005); A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 
41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 769, 770 (2001). 
29 Tarlock, supra note 28, at 770. 
30 See id. 
31 See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better than Less: An Exploration in 
Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 656 n.100 (2008) (“[S]ome Western states have 
recognized rights in instream flows, which entitle their holders to refrain from diversion 
and consumption of water, in order to protect endangered fish, wildlife and habitats, or for 
recreational purposes.”); A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth 
Management and Western Water Law: From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 14 HASTINGS 
W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 983, 994-95 (2008) (“Non-consumptive uses have long 
been recognized, but these uses, such as fishery maintenance flows, were relatively minor 
until the 1970s.”). 
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a pattern in the law and then to follow that pattern.32  Statutory lawmaking, 
on the other hand, lacks a similar coherence-favoring force.  Legislatures 
enact and amend different statutes in different lawmaking moments, each 
associated with its own particular context and its own set of compromises 
among its own set of competing interests exerting pressures on the 
legislators.33  Legislators act in response to those pressures, and by contrast 
face relatively little pressure to conform their decisions to prior patterns, 
except perhaps to some minimal extent necessary to avoid direct conflicts 
among or within statutes that would render a statute unworkable.34   
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Susan Etta Keller, The Rhetoric of Marriage, Achievement, and Power: An 
Analysis of Judicial Opinions Considering the Treatment of Professional Degrees as 
Marital Property, 21 VT. L. REV. 409, 411 (1996) (noting that courts decide cases by 
“extrapolat[ing] the facts at hand into a more universal pattern, connecting the precedent 
they will set to the precedent they follow”). This norm predominates even outside of the 
confines of binding precedent within hierarchical court systems, as evidenced by the many 
cases in which courts of one jurisdiction rely on and address decisions from other 
jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Ortega v. City of New York, 9 N.Y.3d 69, 79 (N.Y. 2007) (citing 
Temple Community Hosp. v. Superior Ct., 20 976 P.2d 223, 232 (Cal. 1999), in which the 
California Supreme Court declined to recognize a tort cause of action for intentional third 
party spoliation of evidence); N.M. v. Lackey, 110 P.3d 512, 515 (N.M. App. 2005) (citing 
Idaho v. Wixom, 947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Idaho 1997), and  Arizona v. Richcreek, 930 P.2d 
1304, 1308 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc), as cases in which, the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Arizona Supreme Court, respectively, concluded on “similar facts” that police officers 
lacked reasonable suspicion to stop a defendant).  Of course this does not mean that judge-
made law is entirely consistent.  Different judges may read precedent differently or view 
the facts differently, and thereby reach different decisions in similar cases.  See, e.g., John 
Burritt McArthur, The Class Action Tool in Oilfield Litigation, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 113, 
148 (1996) (“Even though there is little disagreement over general [class] certification 
standards, the same facts can lead to different results in different courts.”).  Sometimes 
judges simply disagree and decline to follow each other’s decisions.  See, e.g., Philadelphia 
Marine Trade Ass’n-Int’l Longshoremen's  Ass’n Pension Fund v. Comm’r, 523 F.3d 140, 
151-52 (3d Cir. 2008) (explicitly disagreeing with, and declining to follow, Deutsch v. 
Commissioner, 599 F.2d 44, 44-46 (2d Cir.1979), and Miller v. United States, 784 F.2d 
728, 730-31 (6th Cir.1986) (per curiam)).  But the role of precedent-based reasoning in 
judicial decisionmaking nevertheless undeniably exerts an overall force that favors 
coherence. 
33 See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 2, at 67-124 (discussing the political history of the major 
federal environmental statutes). 
34 Areas of the law governed primarily by detailed administrative regulations may fall 
somewhere between judge-made law and statutory law.  Agencies are, like legislatures, 
primarily political institutions.  Like statutes, regulations are promulgated and revised in 
different lawmaking moments, in different contexts that result in different compromises 
among different competing interests.  Moreover, because regulations derive from statutes, 
which may treat similar situations quite differently, differences among statutes may require 
agencies to enact regulations that approach similar problems differently under different 
statutes.  Administrative regulations are almost inevitably more complex than legislation, 
and complexity is associated with incoherence. Cf. Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: 
Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (1992) (arguing that, as 
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These three factors are reasons why coherence, despite its 
advantages, may not be achievable for certain areas of law.  In addition, 
there may be reasons why we would not prefer coherence.  Coherence also 
has its disadvantages. 
First and most important, seeking coherence can lead to imposing a 
framework that creates an appearance of coherence where coherence does 
not in fact exist.35  An organizational framework that prioritizes coherence 
may do so at the cost of imprecisely and inaccurately characterizing the 
field, by ignoring complexity and variation.  Because the law and 
lawmaking processes are often complicated and messy, forged by numerous 
decisionmakers acting in diverse contexts, areas of law seldom live up to 
the ideal of coherence.36  Thinking of a body of law as a coherent legal field 
worthy of particularized study is analogous to putting on blinders and 
                                                                                                                            
compared with legislation, the delegation of discretion to agencies tends to result in legal 
rules that are more complex).  Complexity is not necessarily congruent with incoherence, 
but the two characteristics are at least highly correlated. 
 Other factors, however, may give agencies an incentive to adopt consistent 
approaches in their regulations.  Institutional or professional norms that transcend 
particular statutes may lead agencies to take similar approaches to disparate statutory 
situations, thereby increasing coherence.  Because many of its statutes involve some form 
of evaluating risks to public health and the environment, for example, EPA has adopted 
guidance documents that prescribe a process for assessing carcinogenic risks that applies 
throughout the agency’s activities.  See Notice of Availability of the Document Entitled 
Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,765 (Apr. 7, 2005). 
Moreover, the standards by which courts review agency rules encourage consistency 
among agency decisions.  See, e.g., Westar Energy, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Comm'n, 473 F.3d 1239, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“A fundamental norm of administrative 
procedure requires an agency to treat like cases alike.”); Hall v. McLaughlin, 864 F.2d 868, 
872 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Reasoned decisionmaking requires treating like cases alike; an 
agency may not casually ignore its own past decisions.”) (footnote omitted).  In fact, 
however, most agency rules are more a product of political negotiations among competing 
interest groups than a reasoned attempt to create a coherent body of law. 
35 See, e.g., Robert C. Berring, supra note 22, at 16 (noting that William Blacktone’s 
Commentaries “struggled to place the common law of England into a rational narrative 
structure” but that he “has been roundly excoriated by later critics for bending the data to 
fit his needs”); cf. Chaim Saiman,  Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join the 
Global Restitution Party, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 107 (2008) (noting the legal 
realist view that “coherent classification of legal categories is all but impossible [because 
e]ach instance of adjudication presents a localized act of balancing the competing interests 
that the legal system can neither fully realize nor reconcile”). 
36 See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision 
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 516 (2004) (“Tasks are said to be complex when their 
constitutive considerations are numerous, contradictory, ambiguous, and incommensurate. 
Most legal cases that are litigated and appealed are of this nature, in that the facts can be 
ambiguous, incomplete, and contradictory; different rules, values, and principles can be 
invoked to support opposite conclusions; and the case at hand can be somewhat analogous 
to more than one previous decision.”) (footnote omitted). 
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filters; blinders to obscure situations that lie outside of the field, and filters 
to obscure those aspects of situations that arise within the field but that are 
not focused on by the analytical framework that characterizes the field.  For 
better and worse, that framework defines the universe of “thinkable 
thoughts” as to the category of materials it encompasses.37 Fields of law 
focus attention on a particular aspect of the law only by intentionally 
obscuring other aspects.38  The quest for coherence thus is prone to breeding 
essentialism and reductionism.39  For example, corrective justice accounts 
of tort law, by virtue of their focus on bipolarity—the relationship between 
the tortfeasor and the victim that obligates the tortfeasor directly to rectify 
the victim’s injury—neglect various tort rules that do not reflect 
bipolarity.40  Applying a reductionist framework to achieve coherence 
necessarily oversimplifies the law, disregarding outcomes that do not match 
the coherent ideal.41  Thus, as organizational frameworks yield to coherence 
anxiety, they lose some of their descriptive force.   
Second, chasing coherence discourages experimentation in 
lawmaking.  Permitting a diversity of legal approaches allows lawmaking 
institutions to test various alternative approaches to a particular problem, 
                                                 
37 Daniel Dabney coined the phrase “universe of thinkable thoughts” to describe the way in 
which “categories for classifying the law . . . become the structure of the law,” and 
“thoughts that aren’t represented in the system . . . become unthinkable.”  Daniel Dabney, 
The Universe of Thinkable Thoughts:  Literary Warrant and West’s Key Number System, 
99 L. LIBRARY J. 229, 230 (2007); see also id. at 236 (“The essence of a classification 
scheme is to be a closed list of the salient ideas in the literature it serves, and when the 
system, by omitting an idea, implies that the idea is not sufficiently tailored to be included, 
it can be an obstacle to considering the idea.”).  The phrase is probably more associated 
with Robert Berring, who agrees that Dabney originated the term.  See, e.g., Berring, supra 
note 11, at 311 n.13. 
38 Cf. BOWKER & STAR, supra note 11, at 5 (“[E]ach category valorizes some point of view 
and silences another.”); id. at 44 (noting that the act of creating a classification necessarily 
also entails “deciding what will be visible or invisible within the system”); Dabney, supra 
note 37, at 233 (noting that a classification necessarily implies “that some aspects of the 
situation are more important than others”). 
39 See Ruger, supra note 20, at 629 (noting that the classical field-coherence paradigm 
“favors frames of analysis that are powerfully reductionist in character, and which purport 
to explain a vast array of legal materials with the use of one or a few core conceptual 
building blocks”). 
40 See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 
709-33 (2003). 
41 See Feinman, supra note 14, at 692 (noting that, because classifications necessarily 
emphasize some features and deemphasize others, doctrinal classification leads to “framing 
bias,” which occurs when the classification oversimplifies differences among cases within 
a category); cf. also Simon, supra note 36, at 513 (2004) (explaining “coherence-based 
reasoning,” a theory of cognitive psychology “posit[ing] that the mind shuns cognitively 
complex and difficult decision tasks by reconstructing them into easy ones”). 
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seeing what works and what does not.42  When we demand coherence, we 
may stifle choice.  Coherent accounts of the law can become deterministic, 
helping to perpetuate the patterns they identify by obscuring and 
discouraging opportunities to depart from those identified patterns.  If, for 
example, we identify torts in terms of optimal deterrence through utility-
balancing,43 we may lose sight of its corrective justice aspects.44 
Third, attempting to create coherence through internal logic in the 
law may well be ineffectual.  Incoherence arises from a lack of consensus 
about how to approach a legal problem.  As long as a consensus is lacking, 
lawmaking institutions are unlikely to be able to force coherence, but 
instead may merely push incoherence into other areas.  For example, if 
substantive doctrine within a field were to favor an outcome on which there 
was not consensus, this would create pressure on other areas of legal 
doctrine, such as justiciability, procedure, and remedies, to counterbalance 
that effect in order to reflect the diversity of preferences as to the proper 
outcome.45 
The drawbacks of allowing some incoherence in a field, moreover, 
can easily be overstated.  An inability to be reduced to a few fundamental 
principles “does not mean that [a field] lacks essential, or special, attributes 
worthy of study; nor does it mean that the field lacks an identifiable 
structure and architecture.”46  Indeed, incoherence is itself worthy of study.  
                                                 
42 See RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 163 (1985) (asserting 
the benefits of allowing “diversity and competition” among federal circuit courts); Samuel 
Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 
YALE L.J. 679, 743 (1989) (noting that, when the Supreme Court grants certiorari to 
resolve a conflict among the federal circuits, it “benefit[s] from being able to observe the 
effects of the different legal regimes”); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of 
Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial 
Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 785-86 (1983) (“If two circuits or two states are in 
conflict on a question, other circuits or other states benefit from the clash of views—the 
(literally) competing alternatives. The circuits as well as the states are laboratories for 
social, including judicial, experimentation . . . .”). 
43 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-295 (1965). 
44 See Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification 
for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348 (1990). 
45 See Richard H. Fallon, The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies - And Their 
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006). 
46 Ruger, supra note 20, at 627; see also Elhauge, supra note 1, at 367 (2006) (contending 
that a field of law does not require agreement about the contours, principles, or policy goals 
of the field); Hall, supra note 60, at 356 (“All the pieces do not need to fit into a tidy whole 
for [an area] to be regarded as a legitimate intellectual field, nor does [an area] have to be 
organized by theory or overarching principle.”); Ruger, supra note 20, at 627 (“To say that 
[a field] is messy is not the same as saying it is random; to say it is multifaceted and 
difficult to center on a parsimonious internal core is not the same as saying it defies all 
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Attempting to determine why the law treats apparently similar situations 
differently is an important endeavor toward understanding the law.  It is 
only by grouping materials together in a field that incoherence becomes 
identifiable and susceptible to studied examination.47 
In sum, in order to function as a legal field, an area of law must 
exhibit some minimum degree of coherence that legitimates it as an object 
of particularized study.48  But coherence has drawbacks and pitfalls as well 
as benefits.  Accordingly, we should maintain ambivalence about 
prioritizing coherence in legal taxonomy, and should stay cognizant of what 
a classification conceals as well as what it reveals. 
C.  Threshold Methodological Decisions 
Choosing an organizing framework for a legal field requires certain 
threshold methodological decisions.49  We must define the field—that is, 
identify the scope of situations we want the field to encompass.  We must 
choose those aspects of the field on which we want to focus.  A field of law 
can be understood as arising through the interaction of four underlying 
constitutive dimensions:  factual context, policy tradeoffs, values and 
interests, and legal doctrine.  An organizational framework for a legal field 
can apply to any one or combination of these constitutive dimensions.  
Finally, we must decide whether to employ a descriptive or prescriptive 
organizational framework.  How we resolve these threshold decisions 
depends in part on the characteristics of the field and in part on our own 
methodological inclination or objectives. 
1.  Defining the Field 
 Considering self-consciously how to think about an area of law as a 
legal field requires us first to define the category we want to encompass 
with our analysis.  If we are going to set out to construct an organizational 
framework by which to analyze a legal field, we will need to start with 
some understanding of what we think falls within the category of situations 
that comprise that field.  Defining the field thus differs from cohering the 
                                                                                                                            
abstraction and generalization.”); Silberman, supra note 11, at 1429 (arguing that “a ‘field‘ 
is not necessarily in need of a ‘big think’ unifying theory”). 
47 See id. at 646-47 (noting that legal differences within a field facilitates comparative 
analysis). 
48 Silberman, supra note 11, at 1429 (arguing that an area of law “merits autonomous 
treatment” when it functions as “an interconnected whole”). 
49 Indeed, even if we did not make such decisions deliberately, adopting an organizational 
framework for a field implicitly would decide certain threshold questions. 
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field with an organizational framework, but it is the first step toward a 
framework.50 
The objective in delineating a legal category should be to find a 
definition that is “sufficiently tailored and determinate to provide a 
comprehensible description of the instances that fall within [the 
category].”51  A good definition should yield a coherent concept or 
concepts.52  Moreover, the concepts embodied in the definition must reflect 
the concepts that are analytically helpful in understanding the field.53  Thus, 
the initial task of defining the field is inherently and inextricably 
intertwined with the subsequent task of constructing a common 
organizational framework with which to unify the field.  Although we 
cannot begin our analysis without defining the field that will form the object 
of our analysis, as we analyze the field and come to understand it better, we 
may need to revisit our initial definition, excluding situations that were 
included or including situations that initially were excluded.54 
 There are numerous different ways to define a legal field.  A legal 
field can be defined on the basis of, among other things, a substantive topic 
(e.g., environmental law, labor law, tort law); an aspect of the legal process 
(e.g., statutory interpretation, civil procedure, criminal procedure, 
remedies); an institutional actor (e.g., administrative law, federal courts); or 
a trans-substantive methodological approach (e.g., law and economics, 
comparative law). 
                                                 
50 One could classify the law into categories based solely on the definitions of the 
categories, without applying an organizational framework beyond the mere definitions.  
But such an approach would untether the categories from their function, and therefore their 
rationale.  It is the organizational framework for each field that identifies the analytical 
significance of the field as a category, the rationale for the usefulness of the field as a 
classification. 
51 Sherwin, supra note 12, at 110. 
52 Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1096, 1096 (2002) 
(“Most often, theorists assess a conception by determining whether it is coherent—that is, 
whether it is logical and consistent.”). 
53 The task of identifying the concepts that are analytically helpful in understanding the 
field is addressed infra in Part IC. 
54 Cf. Mark P. Gergen, A Thoroughly Modern Theory of Restitution, 84 TEX. L. REV. 173 
(2005) (contending that to make restitution a coherent field, Peter Birks “had to lop off one 
of its most memorable parts--restitution to reward rescue--and do some conceptual 
legerdemain to include some of its most important parts, such as the right of a joint 
tortfeasor who satisfies a claim to contribution from another joint tortfeasor”) (citing PETER 
BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 170-71 (2d ed. 2005)). 
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2.  The Dimensions of the Field 
After we initially define the field that is the object of our analysis, 
we must choose the aspects of the field on which we want to focus our 
analysis.  In thinking about that choice, it is useful to conceptualize a legal 
field as the interaction among four underlying constitutive dimensions of 
the field:  factual context, policy tradeoffs, values and interests, and legal 
doctrine.55 
Every area of the law operates within a factual context; a set of 
factual characteristics shared in common by situations that arise within the 
field.56  These factual characteristics create certain policy tradeoffs, which 
dictate the range of options available to lawmaking institutions such as 
courts, legislatures, executive branch agencies, or the public.  The 
lawmaking institutions apply values and interests to choose among the 
available options dictated by the tradeoffs.  Legal doctrine—the law of the 
field—arises as the product of the lawmaking institutions’ choices among 
available options; that is, the application of values and interests to policy 
tradeoffs.  The following figure illustrates the relationship among the 
underlying constitutive dimensions—factual context, policy tradeoffs, 
values and interests, and legal doctrine: 
 
Figure 1:  Conceptual Diagram of Generic Legal Field 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 Some aspects of the conceptual model of legal fields developed in this Article do not 
apply well to those fields of law, such as law and economics, that are organized around 
trans-substantive methodological approaches.  See infra note 90 and accompanying text.  
56 The extent to which this factual context is exogenous to the legal system varies 
considerably from field to field.  Personal injuries and property damage exist regardless of 
law, and so the factual context of tort law is for the most part exogenous to the legal 
system.  For other fields, the context is itself a creation of the law.  Taxes, for example, 
cannot exist independently of the law, and so the factual context of tax law is to a 
considerable extent endogenous to the law.  The factual context of fields such as remedies, 
civil procedure, and criminal procedure, moreover, are entirely endogenous to the law, in 
that the questions they address arise wholly within the law itself.  See, e.g., Douglas 
Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field:  A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 164 (2008) 
(noting that the field of remedies addresses “the question of what to do about a completed 
or threatened violation of law”). 
Policy Tradeoffs 
Values and Interests 
Legal Doctrine 
Factual Context 
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The relationship among the underlying constitutive dimensions of 
the law is not just unidirectional from factual context to legal doctrine; the 
relationship runs the opposite direction as well.  Because the law remains 
the ultimate object of our analysis, we can limit our consideration of the 
constitutive dimensions of a legal field to those aspects of the dimensions 
that eventually bear on the form and content of legal rules.57  Elements of 
factual context thus matter if, and only if, they ultimately bear on the values 
and interests that the decisionmaking institution applies to resolve questions 
within the area.  A factual characteristic is only relevant or significant 
insofar it gives rise to a policy tradeoff that matters, and a tradeoff only 
matters if the decisionmaking institution cares about it.  For example, a 
tradeoff between making water available for irrigating agriculture or for 
sustaining aquatic wildlife is significant only insofar as the decisionmaking 
institution cares to some extent about both agriculture and aquatic wildlife.  
Thus, in conceptualizing a field of law, legal taxonomy should care about 
factual characteristics only insofar as they affect legal doctrine, by creating 
policy tradeoffs that actually limit legal choice.58 
Because the interplay among the underlying constitutive dimensions 
produces law, an area of law can be characterized by any or all of its 
underlying dimensions.  Indeed, the academic literature readily yields 
illustrations of analyses that characterize legal fields based on factual 
context,59  policy tradeoffs,60 values and interests,61 or legal doctrine.62 
                                                 
57 Cf. Sherwin, supra note 12, at 108 (“Any two factual settings are alike and unlike in an 
indefinite number of ways, and the only way to determine which similarities and 
differences should count is to refer to some purpose or principle that picks out certain of 
them as relevant to what is being decided.”). 
58 Cf. infra note 67 and accompanying text (arguing that the common features that cohere a 
field must be legally relevant). 
59 Cf. Feinman, supra note 14, at 679-81 (defining factual classification, for which “the 
factual similarities among the situations governed by the doctrines within the system 
provide both the organization and the defining criteria for the category”). 
60 Elhauge, supra note 1, at 366 (2006) (contending that fields require a “common 
intellectual framework” that “illuminate[s] . . . common themes.”); Mark A. Hall, The 
History and Future of Health Care Law:  An Essentialist View, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
347, 356 (2006) (contending that a “legal academic sub-discipline” requires “a core 
substantive focus for the field and a core set of methods of inquiry”); see also Larry 
Reibstein, Leveling the Political Field, THE LAW SCHOOL:  THE MAGAZINE OF THE NEW 
YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Autumn 2008, at 21 (quoting Richard Pildes, one of 
the founders of the field of law of democracy, describing the issues in the field as 
“shar[ing] a common core around the basic questions of [the field]”). 
61 Ruger, supra note 20, at 635 (noting that fields can be analyzed by reference to recurring 
“primary interests,” such as the right to bodily autonomy in health law). 
62 Id. at 629 (noting “the standard coherence impulse in the legal academy,” which “favors 
frames of analysis that are powerfully reductionist in character, and which purport to 
explain a vast array of legal materials with the use of one or a few core conceptual building 
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Thus, when we attempt to characterize an area of law, it may focus 
on just one of these dimensions, or on a combination of dimensions.  The 
patterns that cohere an area of law as a legal field may arise within any of 
the dimensions.  An ideal, complete analytical model of a legal field would 
identify interrelated patterns across all of the dimensions of the field.  
Depending on the features of the area of law, however, this ideal may not be 
possible.  If there is not a stable mix of values and interests that operate in 
an area, there may not be a consistent set of policy tradeoffs that encompass 
decisionmaking.  Or, even if a stable mix of values and interests (and 
therefore a consistent set of policy tradeoffs) exists, if those values and 
interests are not balanced consistently, the legal rules may not have enough 
consistency to yield coherent legal doctrine.  In such situations, our account 
of an area of law necessarily may be limited to an incomplete model that 
addresses only those dimensions of the area that exhibit recognizable 
patterns.  Depending on the objectives of our analysis, this limitation may 
be fatal to the project or insignificant, or something in between. 
3.  Descriptive versus Prescriptive Taxonomy 
In constructing an organizational framework by which to 
characterize a legal field, we also must keep in mind whether we want to 
reflect the area of law from a descriptive (positive) perspective or a 
prescriptive (normative) perspective.63  Descriptive taxonomy attempts to 
reflect an area of the law as it currently exists or traditionally has existed, 
whereas prescriptive taxonomy attempts to reflect how the taxonomer 
thinks the law in the area should exist.  Descriptive taxonomy tends to favor 
classifications that are based on objective, observable characteristics.  These 
characteristics may be self-identified or self-evident from the situations 
themselves, or the taxonomer or other analyst may assign the features to 
situations.64  Prescriptive taxonomy tends to favor classifications that look 
more to the underlying functions ascribed to such characteristics.  In other 
words, descriptive taxonomy attempts only to recognize patterns that 
already exist, whereas prescriptive taxonomy tries to create patterns and 
consistencies. 
                                                                                                                            
blocks”); Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution: A Case of Contemporary Common Law 
Conceptualism, 52 VILL. L. REV. 487, 518 (2007) (noting that the classical scheme was 
based on the identification of a “central conceptual principle underlying each area of law”); 
see also Reibstein, supra note 60, at 21 (quoting Owen Fiss questioning whether the 
founders of the field of “law of democracy” have identified “and ‘autonomous set of 
principles’ governing election law that would properly constitute a law of democracy”). 
63 Cf. Sherwin, supra note 12, at 105-06 (noting that legal taxonomies can classify either 
posited legal rules, ideal legal rules, or “semi-ideal rules attributed to legal decisions”). 
64 Sherwin, supra note 12, at 105-06. 
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In reality, most legal taxonomies to some extent combine descriptive 
and prescriptive elements.  Even a prescriptive taxonomy usually reflects to 
some extent the content of existing law, rather than a purely theoretical 
body of perfect law.  And even where a taxonomy attempts to be 
descriptive, the very process of organizing an area of law based on some 
characteristics and not on others often involves a normative prioritization 
rather than a purely descriptive choice.  Then once we have adopted an 
organizing framework, that framework inevitably affects how we approach 
problems that arise in the area.  Indeed, because the purpose of taxonomy is 
to shape the way we understand that which is being classified, thereby 
affecting how we analyze and think about the area, there is inherently a 
prescriptive aspect to even the most purely descriptive taxonomy.  For 
example, the conclusion that a particular situation has been misclassified—
for example, as a tort rather than a contract dispute—often carries with it the 
consequential conclusion that the wrong rule or set of rules has been applied 
to the situation.65  This is true to a greater extent than in the natural 
sciences, where the taxonomer is much more just an observer.  In the law, 
the taxonomer is also, inherently, part of the project to shape the law as well 
as to observe and to characterize it. 
D.  Minimum Requirements 
Taking into account the considerations we have addressed, we can 
turn now to identifying the characteristics that are required for an area of 
law to constitute a useful classification as a legal field.  At a minimum, a 
legal field must exhibit two characteristics:  commonality and 
distinctiveness.  An organizational framework for a legal field therefore 
must focus on identifying a combination of features that, as a group, are 
common and distinctive to the field.  To the extent that an organizational 
framework focuses on features that are not shared in common within the 
field and are not distinctive to the field, this calls into question the validity 
and usefulness of the organizational framework, and of the legal field itself 
as well. 
1.  Commonality 
A field of law must exhibit some degree of commonality, a 
characteristic or set of characteristics shared in common by the situations 
that arise within the area of law the field encompasses.  Commonalities 
                                                 
65 See, e.g., supra note 17 (citing cases in which classification as a tort or contract makes a 
different as to what legal rule applies). 
 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS A LEGAL FIELD 22 
establish patterns that cohere the field.  These commonalities may arise 
within any of the different underlying constitutive dimensions of the field:  
the factual context, the policy tradeoffs, the values and interests, or the legal 
doctrine.66   
Moreover, not just any commonalities count.  As to the first two 
dimensions—factual context and policy tradeoffs—the commonalities must 
be legally relevant; that is, they must make a difference in how the law 
applies.67  It is only when the common characteristics are legally relevant 
that the materials they encompass appear as an identifiable corpus.  
Otherwise, an area of law appears to be merely an amorphous amalgamation 
of portions of other, existing fields.  Indeed, an area of law unified only by 
factual commonality—that is, a common factual characteristic or 
characteristics that make no difference to the application of the law—is like 
the Law of the Horse,68 a joke rather than a legitimate field of legal study, 
because the various laws that govern activities related to horses have 
nothing legally important in common; the common element of the horse is 
legally irrelevant.69   
The presumption that a legal concept must be defined by reference 
to a single definitional set of characteristics has been criticized. 70  These 
critiques, in turn, call into question whether strict commonality is necessary 
                                                 
66 See supra Part I.C.2. 
67 See Feinman, supra note 14, at 678 (arguing that the factual characteristics that define a 
legal field should be “not arbitrary, but [should] reflect the analytical and instrumental aims 
of the process,” such as “principles, policies, or interests” common to the category); Hall, 
supra note 60, at 361 (arguing that the defining features of a field of law must be “central 
to the analysis or inquiry, rather than . . . simply being an incident of generic law’s subject 
matter”); Ibrahim & Smith, supra note 1, at 74 (contending that whether a factual attribute 
defines a legitimate field of legal study depends on whether the attribute is “a legally 
relevant fact.””); see also Silberman, supra note 11, at 1430 (arguing for the existence of 
international litigation as a field of law “because international and comparative 
perspectives shape and influence the development of rules”). 
68 See supra note 1. 
69 Usually the commonality is descriptive of existing law, rather than a purely normative 
prescription for how one thinks the law should be.  One could imagine, however, an 
emerging field in which a theoretical superstructure precedes any common legal doctrine.  
The field of cyberlaw definitely required the existence of cyberspace, but could have 
preceded the creation of any law of cyberspace by anticipating such law and setting forth a 
normative framework for thinking about it.  It is more difficult to imagine a legitimate field 
of existing law defined by reference to a normative framework that does not match, at least 
in significant part, extant legal doctrine.  At the very least, such a circumstance would seem 
to require defining the field at a sufficient level of generality to encompass both the 
existing doctrine and the theoretical alternative. 
70 See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, The Concept of White Collar Crime in Law and Legal Theory, 
8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2004), David Millon. Objectivity and Democracy, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18 n.54 (1992); J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 
43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 779-99 (1996); Solove, supra note 52, at 1095, 1096. 
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for a legal field.  Scholars advancing the critique have challenged the 
traditional assumption that legal concepts must be unified by a “core 
common denominator”—that is, a set of necessary and sufficient 
characteristics shared in common that “single out [the concept] as 
unique.”71  Drawing on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, these scholars 
argue that some legal concepts are unified instead by “a common pool of 
similar characteristics,” analogous to “ ‘family resemblances,’ ” that forms 
“ ‘a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing’ ” 
that defines the concept.72  This argument suggests that there may be areas 
of the law that do not exhibit strict commonality as to all the features in the 
organizing framework, but nevertheless share enough commonality to 
cohere the area as a useful category and legal field. 
2.  Distinctiveness 
However useful in some respects it may be to conceptualize the law 
in terms of fields or categories, there are dangers from becoming too 
comfortable living within categories.  Taxonomy has the capacity to 
obscure as well as illuminate.  One potential problem with dividing the law 
generally into discrete fields is that it may obscure larger principles that 
transcend the particular field.73  Classifying the law into legal fields focuses 
attention on particular aspects of the law by obscuring other aspects.  A 
framework for thinking about a field or category thus necessarily also keeps 
us from not thinking about the field—that is, from seeing commonalities 
across fields or categories.74  For example, an overemphasis on classifying 
statutory laws into topic areas—environmental, labor, health care, tax, 
etcetera—may obscure the importance of trans-substantive tools of statutory 
interpretation that predominate over topic-specific interpretive methods.  
For a legal field to be legitimate, there must be a good reason to focus on 
the particular category; that is, some reason not to look to some broader set 
of materials. 
Distinctiveness—the idea that some features of the field are distinct 
to the field, not present in other areas—provides just such a justification.  
Thus, an area of law unified by a common, legally relevant feature (pattern) 
                                                 
71 Solove, supra note 52, at 1096, 1095. 
72 Id. at 1095-97; see also Solove, supra note 11, at 486. 
73 See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 207. 
74 Cf. Dabney, supra note 37, at 235 (noting that employing a classification that needlessly 
separates cases from each other “has the potential at least to make the law less coherent” by 
obscuring characteristics that transcend categories in the classification). 
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is not a legal field unless the organizing feature is distinctive to the area.75  
Distinctiveness can arise directly from unique features of the field, or from 
the unique interplay of otherwise non-unique features.76 
Distinctiveness in legal doctrine may mean that the field is governed 
by unique legal rules that apply only within the field (field exceptionalism).  
Alternatively it may mean that, although unique rules do not govern the 
field, the application of general rules results in outcomes that are unique to 
the field, because the field provides a factually unique context that affects 
the application of particular rules, or because the field’s context results in a 
unique interplay of rules. 
The individual features comprising the organizational framework 
that coheres a field need not necessarily each be distinctive to the field.  
Rather, it is the defining features as a set that must be distinctive.  There 
are, for example, some features that are common to both labor law and 
contract law—after all, the employer-employee relationship is 
fundamentally contractual—but that does not mean that they are not each 
legitimate legal fields. 
Moreover, distinctiveness does not necessarily equate with 
uniqueness.  Just as scholars have argued persuasively that strict 
commonality may be unnecessary,77 strict uniqueness also may be 
unnecessary.  A legal field may exist where the field’s set of defining 
                                                 
75 Although they have articulated the criterion in different ways, several scholars have 
identified some form of distinctiveness as a requirement for a legitimate legal field.  See 
Carter, supra note 94, at 244 (contending that “a field becomes a field” when “concepts 
and legal norms [arise] that will prevail uniquely in that context” and the field thereby 
receives “some special treatment . . . in the law”); Elhauge, supra note 1, at 369 (“[D]oes 
the purported field address the legal treatment of a distinct set of relations?”); Hall, supra 
note 60, at 357-58 (“For a body of substantive law to emerge as a distinctive field of 
intellectual inquiry, it must be more than just an assortment of rules that results from 
applying other bodies of substantive law to a particular economic sector or human activity. 
Such a field is not intellectually distinctive unless there are one or more attributes of the 
economic or social enterprise in question that make it uniquely important or difficult in the 
legal domain.”); Peter W. Hohenhaus, An Introductory Perspective on Computer Law:  Is 
It, Should It Be, and How Do We Best Develop It as, a Separate Discipline?, 1991 WL 
330761 (April, 1991) (“The subject matter of the proposed discipline and its legal 
ramifications should not comfortably or effectively fit within existing legal frameworks.”); 
Ibrahim & Smith, supra note 1, at 76 (“[A] new field of legal study is justified when a 
discrete factual setting generates the need for distinctive legal solutions. This 
distinctiveness may manifest itself in the creation of a unique set of legal rules or legal 
practices, in the unique expression or interaction of more generally applicable legal rules, 
or in unique insights about law.”). 
76 See Ibrahim & Smith, supra note 1, at 85. 
77 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
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features are unified by sufficient similarity and distinctiveness—even if not 
perfect uniqueness—to merit unified consideration.78 
E.  Additional Attribute:  Transcendence 
In addition to commonality and distinctiveness, Frank Easterbrook 
has argued that fields of legal study also should have trans-substantive 
implications—that is, that legal fields should “illuminate the entire law” and 
teach “general rules.”79  Easterbrook expressed this position specifically as 
an objection to the existence of cyberlaw as a legal field.80  In response to 
Easterbrook’s argument, Lawrence Lessig defended the study of cyberlaw 
as a legal field by arguing that the application of law to cyberspace has 
yielded insights that are both distinctive and transcendent.81  On the one 
hand, the distinctive features of cyberspace as a context for the application 
of law yield unique insights:  “We see something when we think about the 
regulation of cyberspace that other areas would not show us.”82  On the 
other hand, these insights are not limited to cyberlaw:  they illustrate 
“general concerns, not particular” and illuminate “lessons for law 
generally.”83  Together, Lessig argues, this combination of distinctiveness 
and transcendence “suggest[s] a reason to study cyberspace law for reasons 
beyond the particulars of cyberspace.”84  Easterbrook’s and Lessig’s 
comments on the benefits of transcendence highlight an additional, 
potentially important characteristic of a legal field:  a transcendence that 
justifies studying the field in order to understand better the law in general.85 
                                                 
78 Cf. Feinman, supra note 14, at 699 (“The elements of different paradigms overlap, but 
there is considerable redundancy among the elements of a particular paradigm; that is, most 
of the elements of a paradigm are more highly correlated with elements of the same 
paradigm than with elements of other paradigms.”). 
79 Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 207.  Although Eastbrook expresses a preference for 
principles that apply to “the entire law,” perhaps stemming from his allegiance to a trans-
substantive law and economics framework, he seems to recognize that at least some of the 
general or unifying principles he seeks to illuminate may apply only in certain categories of 
cases.  See, e.g., id. at 208 (noting “broader rules about commercial endeavors”).  His 
inclination, however, is clearly toward drawing the most expansive categories possible. 
80 E.g., Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 208 (arguing that, instead of developing a law of 
cyberspace, we should “[d]evelop a sound law of intellectual property, then apply it to 
computer networks”). 
81 Lessig, supra note 1, at 502-03. 
82 Id. at 502. 
83 Id. at 503; see also id. (field should “suggest a reason to study [the field] for reasons 
beyond the particulars of [the field]”). 
84 Id. at 503. 
85 See also Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, Or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be 
Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 541 (1994) (praising academic authors who 
“undertake tax-specific work that generates insights into the process of statutory 
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After we have identified distinctiveness as a requisite for the validity 
of a legal field, it may seem odd to look for transcendence.  Distinctiveness 
and transcendence may seem mutually exclusive, or at least oppositional, 
but in fact their relationship is more complicated.  The distinctiveness of the 
field, some special combination of factors, may be what causes the field to 
illuminate transcendent insights.  Observing how the presence of a factual 
characteristic that is unique to the field affects the development of legal 
doctrine within the field may offer important insights into how the absence 
of the factual characteristic in other fields affects the development of legal 
doctrine in those fields.   
For example, there are many similarities between the factual context 
of occupational safety and health law and environmental law.  In many 
cases, both areas are concerned with the same types of health hazards posed 
by the same types of substances.86  A crucial difference, however, is the 
important role of the employer-employee contractual relationship in 
occupational safety and health law, a factual element for which there is no 
analog in most environmental law cases.  Analyzing how the employer-
employee contractual relationship affects occupational safety and health law 
may well yield insights into how the absence of an analogous contractual 
relationship between polluters and the public affects, or should affect, the 
content of environmental law. 
Unlike commonality and distinctiveness, transcendence is not 
required to legitimate a field of legal study.87  If, for example, studying 
environmental law helps us to understand environmental law, that suffices 
to justify the study of environmental law, even if studying environmental 
law does not also help us to understand law that is not environmental.88  
Regardless whether the transcendence criterion is necessary, however, it is 
clearly an additional benefit that enhances the value of studying the field. 89 
                                                                                                                            
construction generally”) (citing Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral 
Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623, 626-27 (1986), and 
Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the 
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991)). 
86 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (regulating occupational exposure to mercury in air); 40 
C.F.R. Part 61 Subpart E (regulating environmental emissions of mercury into air). 
87 See Greely, supra note 1, at 405-06 (“[M]any time-honored law school subjects and legal 
fields are . . . courses and fields about the law as it is applied in specific settings, not about 
generalized law . . . . [A]lthough health law provides some insights that may be useful in 
other areas of the law, . . . that is not crucial to its importance.”). 
88 Indeed, Lessig accepts Easterbrook’s challenge to satisfy his transcendence test without 
conceding that cyberspace must satisfy the test to achieve legitimacy.   
89 Jay Feinman has expressed concern that the pursuit of transcendence may succeed too 
well, yielding “a metaprinciple that threatens to dissipate [the particular field’s] integrity as 
an independent subject and render it a mere application of some transcendent method of 
analysis.”  Feinman, supra note 14, at 671.  Feinman’s point is analogous to the 
 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS A LEGAL FIELD 27 
F.  Caveats and Clarifications 
Having thus proposed an approach to the characterization of a legal 
field though the development of an organizational framework, several 
caveats and clarifications are in order. 
First, the approach set forth in this Article intentionally focuses on 
the substance of the law, rather than on the processes that produce and 
apply substantive law.  Most conspicuously, I have omitted any attempt to 
address questions of which institutions and regulatory tools are employed or 
should be employed in making and implementing law, or even to analyze 
how choices among institutions and regulatory tools affect the substance of 
the law.  For example, there may be systematic differences among the 
content of legal rules produced through common law adjudication, legal 
rules enacted by legislatures, and legal rules promulgated by administrative 
agencies.  Such questions are undoubtedly of fundamental importance, and 
by excluding them I do not mean to suggest that they can be ignored.  
Indeed, they cannot be completely severed from questions about the 
substance of the law.  It nevertheless is both possible and helpful, however, 
sometimes to think about substantive law separate from these 
considerations.  A substantive framework, in turn, can provide a means of 
evaluating alternative institutional arrangements and regulatory tools. 
Second, some aspects of the conceptual model of legal fields 
developed in this Part do not apply well to fields of law, such as law and 
economics, that are organized around trans-substantive methodological 
approaches.90  Such methodological fields have no distinctive corpus of 
law, and therefore also none of the underlying constitutive dimensions we 
have identified here.  As a result, methodological fields cannot be unified 
by an organizational framework based upon patterns in the underlying 
constitutive dimensions of a particular area of law.  Instead, methodological 
fields are unified by a common yet distinctive methodological approach to 
analyzing legal situations generally.  The trans-substantive methodology 
that defines the field also provides the organizational framework that 
coheres it.  The methodology, and not underlying constitutive dimensions, 
must exhibit the minimum characteristics of commonality and 
distinctiveness.  By virtue of their trans-substantiveness, methodological 
fields also necessarily exhibit transcendence.  Methodological fields differ 
                                                                                                                            
aforementioned concern that that excessive pursuit of coherence may lead analyses to 
overlook meaningful variations in the law.  See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. 
90 See supra text following note 54 (noting that legal fields can be organized on the basis 
of, among other things, a substantive topic, an aspect of the legal process, an institutional 
actor, or a trans-substantive methodological approach (e.g., law and economics, 
comparative law). 
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analytically in these ways from other types of legal fields, and do not 
present the same organizational challenges to coherence that arise within 
other fields.  On the other hand, methodological fields may raise other 
organizational challenges, such as determining what specific methodologies 
fall within a particular methodological field. 
Third, the usefulness of a field—its power to explain a set of 
situations—does not depend merely on whether it meets minimum 
standards of commonality and distinctiveness.  Even among fields that 
exhibit commonality and distinctiveness, there still may be tremendous 
variation in the strength of organization of the field, as measured by the 
explanatory power of the field’s organizational framework.  We have seen 
above that a framework’s explanatory power depends on several factors, 
including the extent to which the pattern predominates within the field.91  
Now we have added the additional observation that a field’s organizational 
framework must focus on the field’s common and distinctive features.  
Integrating these two ideas yields the proposition that a framework’s 
explanatory power depends in part on the extent to which common and 
distinctive features (which are part of the framework) predominate within 
the field over other features (which are not part of the framework).  In other 
words, of the situations that arise within the field, to what extent are those 
situations captured by the organizing features of the field, as opposed to 
other features of the individual case that are either not shared in common in 
the field or not distinctive to the field?  The more that the common and 
distinctive features predominate, the more coherent the field, and the more 
powerful the framework that defines the field in terms of those features will 
be as a tool for understanding the corpus of law encompassed by the field. 
Fourth, for any particular field, there may be multiple alternative 
frameworks that organize the field in a useful way.  Frameworks can focus 
on different dimensions of a field, or on combinations of dimensions.  
Frameworks can be articulated at varying degrees of generality or 
abstraction.  In some cases, one framework may be clearly superior to 
another in its ability to explain a field.  In other cases, however, one 
analytical framework will be more useful for some analyses, and another 
will prove more useful for other tasks.92 
Fifth, although an area of law must exhibit commonality and 
distinctiveness to be a legal field, in some cases there may be benefits to 
other categorizations of the law that do not meet these requirements.  Even 
some legal areas organized only on the basis of factual commonality may 
still have some utility for some purposes.  Law firms, for example, may 
                                                 
91 See supra text following note 15. 
92 See Mattei, supra note 11, at 8 (“[N]o taxonomy can claim universality by serving every 
. . . purpose better than every alternative one.”). 
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form practice groups to market themselves to a particular industry—for 
example, a chemical practice group staffed with lawyers familiar with 
technical aspects and legal requirements of the chemical industry.93  Law 
schools may teach classes addressing subject matters that attract particularly 
strong student interest and use the course to illustrate cross-cutting legal 
issues, rather than to study the subject matter as a distinct corpus of law.94  
Such classifications may be useful for their limited purposes despite the 
lack of a distinctive and coherent body of law required for a true legal field. 
As Douglas Laycock’s history of remedies as a legal field95 
suggests, the organization and specialization of legal practice influences the 
development and recognition of legal fields.  Where lawyers do not 
organize themselves or specialize in terms of a particular category, this 
creates a substantial impediment to the development of that category as a 
legal field, even if the category has all the attributes of a legitimate field.  
Laycock makes this point with respect to the field of remedies:  because 
practitioners do not specialize in remedies, it fell entirely on legal 
academics to develop the field.96  Where, on the other hand, lawyers 
organize their practice by reference to a category, this highlights the 
category as a potential field, and also creates a demand for other correlates 
of a legal field, such as practice materials, conferences, academic research, 
and law school courses.  Together, these factors are likely to spur 
development and recognition of the category as a legal field. 
Sixth, although the construction of a legal field may sound like a 
rather orderly and logically rigorous process in which the scope of a legal 
field and its internal organizing features appear clear, distinct, and well-
defined, the law often is not so simple.  Any particular situation may 
implicate and benefit from multiple conceptual frameworks, whether 
because the situation can helpfully be considered as arising within multiple 
different fields, or because even within a particular field the situation can 
helpfully be considered from multiple different organizing frameworks, or 
both.97  This complexity is not necessarily a problem; each of the various 
                                                 
93 See, e.g., http://www.cojk.com/ourpractice/chemicalprocesspatents.html; 
http://www.mhmlaw.com/brochure/chemical.pdf. 
94 See W. Burlette Carter, Introduction:  What Makes a “Field” a Field?, 1 VA. J. SPORTS 
& L. 235 (1999) (advocating “the need for a law school curriculum that provides 
opportunities for integration” of multiple legal fields and identifying sports law as a 
“bridge course” that could help meet this need). 
95 See Laycock, supra note 56, at 167-68. 
96 See id. 
97 Some private law theorists have posited that, under a proper taxonomic system, legal 
categories can be arranged in a hierarchy whereby categories at the same level of generality 
do not overlap.  See, e.g., Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, 79 
TEX. L. REV. 1767, 1781 (2001) (“The test of the validity of a taxonomy is precisely the 
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organizing frameworks emphasizes particular angles and insights into the 
situation.  That being said, to the extent that a situation arises within 
multiple different fields, each of which may prescribe a different set of legal 
rules, or at least different understandings of what the situation entails, field 
overlap does present a challenge.  For example, when the federal 
government brings suit against the parent corporation of a defunct chemical 
company for the costs of cleaning up industrial waste generated by the 
defunct company’s chemical plant, should the issue be viewed primarily as 
a question of environmental law, which would tend to emphasize broad 
liability to accomplish the cleanup of environmental contamination, or 
corporate law, which would emphasize the limited liability of a parent 
corporation for the actions of its subsidiaries?98  Such situations of 
overlapping fields “present problems for a system of doctrinal classification 
at the same that they offer particularly sharp examples for the delineation of 
the processes of doctrinal classification.”99   
II.  WHY IS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW A LEGAL FIELD? 
Having addressed in Part I how we might think generally about a 
field of law, Part II focuses on environmental law as a legal field.  We begin 
by examining two noteworthy prior efforts to cohere environmental law as a 
legal field.  I argue that neither of these works satisfactorily conceptualizes 
environmental law as a legal field; both offer an incomplete account of the 
field that is tied too closely with environmentalism.  The remainder of Part 
II develops my proposed framework for understanding environmental law.  
My framework identifies two fundamental common and distinct factual 
characteristics of environmental problems:  physical public resources and 
pervasive interrelatedness.  Because of the multiplicity of uses that are 
made of environmental resources and the pervasive interrelatedness among 
these uses, conflicts among uses arise and are exceedingly difficult to 
manage.  These use conflicts define the policy tradeoffs that frame 
environmental lawmaking, forming the basis for a use-conflict framework 
for conceptualizing environmental lawmaking.   
                                                                                                                            
question of whether any item within its purview can appear in more than one category 
purportedly pitched at the same level of generality.”); see also Feinman, supra note 14, at 
664 (“Every categorization implies a choice between categories, a decision that the case 
belongs in one place rather than another.”).  However ill- or well-advised such a rule in the 
private law context, see Sherwin, supra note 12, at 123 (expressing “doubt” about Birks’ 
position), for public law, such a rule seems demonstrably wrong.   
98 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
99 Feinman, supra note 14, at 668. 
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A.  Critique of Prior Approaches 
 This Section examines and critiques two important prior efforts to 
explain environmental law as a coherent legal field:  Dan Tarlock’s 2004 
article, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?,100 and David 
Westbrook’s 1994 article, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence.101  Both 
articles offer interesting insights into environmental law, for which they are 
often cited in environmental law scholarship.102  In the end, however, 
despite these contributions, neither Tarlock nor Westbrook achieves his 
ultimate objective of explicating a conceptually unified environmental law. 
1.  Dan Tarlock’s Environmental Conceptualism 
Dan Tarlock’s 2004 article, Is There a There There in 
Environmental Law?,103 is probably the foremost extant work addressing 
the question whether, and why, environmental law is a legal field by 
attempting to develop a set of principles for environmental law.  For 
Tarlock, an august figure in environmental law scholarship, the project has 
very real practical significance.  Although Tarlock acknowledges that 
“environmental law is very much embedded in the legal landscape,” and 
that “[t]he legal profession never harbored any doubts about the legitimacy 
of environmental law,” he nevertheless frets over “three related but 
disturbing features of environmental law that make its future survival 
problematic”:104 
First, it is, in the span of legal time, an infant area of the law 
that may not necessarily live to maturity. Second, its survival 
is more problematic than other areas of law because it is not 
an organic mutation of the common law, or more generally, 
                                                 
100 Tarlock, supra note 10. 
101 See Westbrook, supra note 5. 
102 For examples of works excerpting or citing Tarlock’s article, see, e.g., DANIEL A. 
FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 4-8 (7th ed. 2006); 
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:  LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 
62-63 (5th ed. 2006); Daniel A. Farber, Foreword, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 383, 388 (2005).For 
examples of works citing Westbrook’s article, see, e.g., David M. Driesen, The Societal 
Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 553 n.21 (1997); Douglas A. Kysar, The Consultants' Republic, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2058 n.41 (2008); Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in 
Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 897, 908 n.63; Eric W. Orts & Paula C. Murray, 
Environmental Disclosure and Evidentiary Privilege, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 69 n.210 
(1997). 
103 Tarlock, supra note 10. 
104 Id. at 215, 216, 217. 
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the western legal tradition. Third, as a result of the first two, 
environmental law remains largely unintegrated into our 
legal system; thus, it is vulnerable to marginalization as 
support for environmentalism ebbs and flows.105 
Tarlock views environmentalism as “a potentially transformative . . . 
paradigm shift” in our culture that will be in danger unless and until it 
becomes embedded in “a stable legal regime to reflect this meta-value 
transition.”106  The construction of such a stable legal regime, he believes, 
would make environmental law “real law.”107  For Tarlock, “areas of ‘real 
law’” require “a set of distinctive, fundamental principles . . . that can be 
applied to a wide range of current and future issues.”108  These principles 
would insulate environmental law from political whims, providing “legal 
drag on the amplitude of the political oscillations” and enabling 
environmental law to achieve “permanence and acceptance.”109  Without 
such principles, environmental law faces the possibility of “total 
assimilation and marginalization” in the law generally.”110 
In order to meet this perceived need, Tarlock proposes five 
“candidate principles” of environmental law: 
A.  Minimize Uncertainty Before and As You Act 
B.  Environmental Degradation Should Be A Last Resort 
After All Reasonable, Feasible Alternatives Have Been 
Exhausted 
C. Risk Can be a Legitimate Interim Basis for Prohibition of 
An Activity 
D. Polluters Must Continually Upgrade Waste Reduction and 
Processing Technology 
                                                 
105 Id. at 217. 
106 Id. at 218, 219.  Tarlock offers labor law as an example of a field that has ossified.  
Labor law “was once a new and dynamic area of the law, but now suffers from a 
combination of legislative and judicial hostility.”  Id. at 226. 
107 Id. at 221. 
108 Id. at 218; see also id. at 228 (“One of the primary characteristics of a distinct area of 
law is that it contains a relatively unique set of core principles distinguishing it from other 
areas of law.”); id. at 222-23 (arguing that environmental law compares unfavorably to 
iconic fields such as contract, tort, property, and criminal law that exhibit “a pre-existing 
set of widely accepted legal doctrines”). 
109 Id. at 220, 222. 
110 Id. at 230. 
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E. Environmental Decisionmaking Should Be Inclusive 
Rather Than Exclusive within the Limits of Rationality111 
He envisions these principles as “rebuttable presumptions” to structure 
environmental decisionmaking processes, rather than “hard” substantive 
rules.112  This is necessary because “the science-based nature of 
environmental law precludes the definition of hard rules and pushes the law 
toward process rather than consistent outcome.”113 
2.  David Westbrook’s Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence 
 Like Tarlock, David Westbrook’s 1994 article, Liberal 
Environmental Jurisprudence,114 also sets out to organize environmental 
law into “a coherent whole” and thereby to establish environmental law as a 
legitimate discipline.115  Westbrook posits that environmental law can be 
understood as a struggle to protect environmental values, which transcend 
individual human welfare, within a liberal legal system that responds only 
to impacts on individual humans.116 
In support of his thesis, Westbrook classifies environmental law into 
three stages, which together “form an idealized history that conceptually 
organizes the materials of environmental law.”117  In the first stage, archaic 
environmental law attempted to address environmental damage through 
common law tort.118  Archaic environmental law conceptualizes 
environmental harms as infringements on individual rights and seeks to 
redress those infringements through traditional common law 
mechanisms.119  The second stage, classical environmental law, addresses 
environmental problems through bureaucratic regulation.120  Classical 
environmental law strives for the ideal of an efficient market.121  It views 
environmental problems as market failures, and intervenes in markets with 
regulation intended to internalize the costs of environmental damage.122  
The third stage, modern environmental law, addresses environmental 
                                                 
111 Id. at 249-53. 
112 Id. at 220. 
113 Id. at 240. 
114 See Westbrook, supra note 5. 
115 Id. at 621. 
116 Id. at 622-23 & n.3. 
117 Id. at 622. 
118 Id. at 631-47. 
119 Id. at 680. 
120 Id. at 647-62. 
121 Id. at 662, 681. 
122 Id. at 652, 661. 
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problems by attempting to construct markets.123  Market incentives, both 
positive (entitlements) or negative (taxes), allow market behavior to achieve 
environmental objectives.124 
The problem with each of these stages, as Westbrook sees it, is that 
they attempt to use a liberal legal system, premised on the protection of 
personal autonomy, to vindicate environmental values that do not translate 
well into a liberal framework because they are not limited to protecting 
personal autonomy.125  Thus, “[e]nvironmental law can be understood as a 
series of attempts to phrase concern for the context of human life in a 
political philosophy grounded on individual choice.”126  Because these 
attempts inevitably will fail, environmental law will be complete only when 
it steps outside of the liberal framework and embraces the value of nature 
qua nature.127 
3.  Critique 
 Both Tarlock’s and Westbrook’s observations about environmental 
law are well taken.  Anyone familiar with environmental law will recognize 
in Tarlock’s five candidate principles some of the recurring issues in the 
field.128  And Westbrook’s account of environmental law offers important 
                                                 
123 Id. at 663-80. 
124 Id. at 667. 
125 Id. at 692. Westbrook is not the first scholar, of course, to note the difficulty of 
protecting environmental values within a legal, social, and economic system that focuses 
overwhelmingly on individual human welfare.  See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource 
Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269, 295-96 (1989) (“As long as government is 
making the legal rules and as long as only humans vote, the concerns of nature never will 
be reflected directly in our nation’s governmental policy. Most environmental laws enacted 
to date focus on protecting people’s interest in the natural environment.”).  On the other 
hand, the “the pervasive connections between human welfare and the surrounding 
environment,” Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV. 
1505, 1549 (2008), mean that almost every environmental impact affects human welfare in 
some way.  See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Three Economies:  An Essay in Honor of Joseph 
Sax, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 411, 433 (1998) (“Some marketplace externalities may only affect 
natural systems, with no human consequences, but many others pass through the 
environment into the human welfare context of civic-societal economics.”). 
126 Id. at 708; see also id. at 695 (“Environmental law can be understood as a succession of 
attempts to square the circle and phrase claims of the external environment within the 
internal logic of liberalism.”); id. at 701 (“The emergence of illiberal values, such as a 
substantive value in nature, within the context of liberal law is thus incessantly 
problematic.”). 
127 Id. at 709, 711. 
128 For example, a recent major Supreme Court environmental case, Environmental Defense 
v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007), involved a dispute between federal regulators 
and the owner of a coal-fired electricity generating plant over whether modifications the 
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insights into some of the difficulties faced in making environmental law 
through systems, institutions, and processes that are in many ways ill-suited 
to a full consideration of the natural environment.  But, in my assessment, 
neither Tarlock nor Westbrook ultimately meet their goal of cohering 
environmental law as a legal field. 
Both Tarlock and Westbrook focus on conceptualizing 
environmental law by reference to environmentalist ideals.  Although 
environmentalism obviously plays an important role in environmental 
lawmaking, the centrality of environmentalism to Tarlock’s and 
Westbrook’s frameworks is to their arguments’ detriment in at least two 
respects. 
First, to the extent that Tarlock and Westbrook intend their accounts 
to describe environmental law as it exists,129 rather than some normative 
ideal, their focus on environmentalism renders their characterization of 
environmental law incomplete.  Environmentalism does not predominate in 
current environmental law, and there is little prospect of that changing 
significantly in the future.  Instead, environmental law reflects a balance 
among a variety of competing values and interests, which include 
environmentalism but also other, arguably more powerful, values such as 
maintaining traditional patterns of resource exploitation and resistance to 
government regulation.130  Indeed, even Tarlock’s principles, which he 
proposes as tools for advancing environmentalism, acknowledge at least 
implicitly that environmentalism has to be balanced against other values 
and interests.131  It is that balance among competing demands on 
                                                                                                                            
owner made at the plant rendered the plant a new or modified source that, under the Clean 
Air Act, is required to adopt more stringent pollution control technology.  Duke Energy is a 
clear example of a case implicating Tarlock’s fourth principle, which holds that polluters 
must continually upgrade waste reduction and processing technology.  Tarlock, supra note 
10, at 252. 
129 Tarlock is unclear about whether his principles are primarily descriptive or prescriptive.  
See Tarlock, supra note 10, at 249 (describing his candidate principles as “a mix of how 
environmental law has evolved and how it should evolve”).  Westbrook adopts a largely 
descriptive framework, which he employs at the end of his article to make prescriptive 
arguments.  See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 621 (identifying his goal of organizing “the 
basic materials of environmental law”—“the key statutes, cases, and articles that every 
environmental lawyers knows and every casebook contains”—“into a coherent whole”); id. 
at 711 (arguing in favor of “[a] vision of nature adequate to inform environmental 
jurisprudence” that would “transform politics”). 
130 See infra text accompanying note 158. 
131 Thus, Tarlock’s first principle posits that environmental law should minimize 
uncertainty before actions are taken, Tarlock, supra note 10, at 249—but also 
acknowledges that decisions must be made despite lingering uncertainty, see id. at 249 
(acknowledging that some information will be acquired “as you act,” after an initial 
decision has been made).  Tarlock’s second principle advocates avoiding environmental 
degradation, id. at 250—but he acknowledges that “a general non-degradation standard . . . 
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environmental resources, more than anything, that defines environmental 
decisionmaking.  Moreover, this balance is a central, inherent, and internal 
part of environmental law itself, not, as both Tarlock and Westbrook seem 
to assume, an external threat to environmental law.  By relegating these 
countervailing considerations to an ancillary role in their frameworks, and 
failing to address how to balance among competing considerations, 
Tarlock’s and Westbrook’s accounts of environmental law lose much of 
their potential descriptive and prescriptive efficacy. 
Second, Tarlock’s and Westbrook’s invocations of 
environmentalism oversimplify the variety of values and interests that can 
be associated with environmental protection.  Environmental protection 
means different specific things in different situations and to different 
people; in any given scenario, a diverse range of values and interests may 
claim to fall under the general category of environmental protection:  
tourism, recreation, wildlife habitat, sustainable resource extraction, 
absolute preservation, and a host of others.  Various combinations of these 
values and interests may be relevant to a particular environmental decision.  
These values and interests may conflict.  Environmental protection thus is 
not monolithic.  By employing the broad category of environmental 
protection to animate their characterization of environmental law, Tarlock 
and Westbrook obscure many of the most vexing tradeoffs facing 
environmental decisionmakers. 
In addition to tying their frameworks for unifying environmental law 
too closely to environmentalism, Tarlock and Westbrook also are 
conceptually underinclusive.  Tarlock confines his search for a conceptual 
core of environmental law to the content of legal doctrine, not to any of the 
other dimensions of environmental law:  factual context, policy tradeoffs, 
and values and interests.132  This probably stems in part from Tarlock’s 
practical objective of promoting environmental protection through the 
application of environmental law;133 to a large extent, Tarlock cares only 
                                                                                                                            
is not possible” and that degradation should be allowed “if there are no acceptable 
alternatives,” id.  Tarlock’s third principle asserts that government can regulate substances 
or activities based on a risk of an adverse impact, without proving that the impact will 
definitely occur—but only if the government can justify the regulation. Id. at 251-52.  
Tarlock’s fourth principle provides that environmental law should continuously advance 
technology—but a source that recently upgraded to the prior best available technology, at 
great expense, must be exempted, at least temporarily, from further upgrades.  Id. at 252.  
Tarlock’s fifth and final principle advocates making decisions inclusive—except when 
doing so exceeds the limits of rationality. Id. at 253. 
132 See supra Part I.C.2. 
133 See, e.g., id. at 228 (expressing concern that environmental law “will lose power in the 
judicial and political arena”); id. at 254 (expressing his hope that environmental law will 
“evolve into a permanent check on the full range of resource consumption decisions”).  
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about whether environmental law accomplishes environmental protection, 
and therefore only about the content of environmental law doctrine.  To the 
extent there is coherence in environmental law outside of environmental 
law doctrine, Tarlock may simply not care, at least for the purposes of his 
article.   
On the other hand, Tarlock does repeatedly invoke the idea that 
environmental law can or must be reduced to “a set of distinctive, 
fundamental principles”134 if it is to be a legitimate legal field or “real 
law.”135  In this respect, he seems to accept the conceptualist assumption 
that a legal field can only exhibit coherence to the extent it can be reduced 
to a few fundamental principles.  Such an approach neglects coherence 
arising from other dimensions of a field.  Moreover, whatever the merits of 
conceptualism136 as an approach in other legal fields,137 it seems poorly 
matched to environmental law.  As Tarlock’s candidate principles 
themselves reflect by their failure to address the tradeoffs they implicate, 
environmental law lacks the level of internal logic and consistency in its 
legal doctrine that would be necessary to yield conceptualist principles.138  
The context of environmental law is too nuanced to yield simple principles.  
This does not mean, however, as Tarlock seems to think, that environmental 
law lacks a conceptual core or is not a legal field.139 
 Nor does Westbrook’s “limits of liberalism” theory accomplish his 
goal of organizing the entirety of environmental law into “a coherent 
whole.”  Merely valuing nature qua nature would not, as Westbrook asserts, 
render environmental law “substantively complete,”140 because the 
challenges of environmental law are not limited to value-balancing.  To the 
contrary, the distinctive features of environmental resources, and in 
particular the complex web of pervasive interrelationships among uses of 
those resources, make it extremely difficult to manage the environment, 
                                                 
134 Id. at 218. 
135 Id. at 218, 221, 222-23, 228. 
136 “ ‘Conceptualism’ describes legal theories that place a high value on the creation (or 
discovery) of a few fundamental principles and concepts at the heart of a system . . . .”  
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1983). 
137 Cf. supra Part I.B. 
138 See infra Part II.F. 
139 It is interesting that Tarlock identifies, as a conceptual “model” for environmental law, 
areas of natural resource law that exhibit coherence based on “the special physical 
characteristics of a resource and the social dynamics that shaped the conflicts over the use 
of it.”  Tarlock, supra note 10, at 230.  To my mind, Tarlock’s subsequent analysis of 
environmental law in his article does not particularly reflect this conceptual model.  The 
approach to environmental law that I propose in this Article, however, strongly resembles 
this conceptual model.  See infra Part II.C-.F. 
140 Id. at 711. 
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regardless of what mix of values we are trying to vindicate.141  Thus, not 
nearly every problem of environmental law derives from value-balancing, 
let alone from the particular difficulties that arise from the limitations of 
liberalism. 
 Even as to the specific focus of Westbrook’s framework, the 
inability of liberalism to vindicate environmental values, his account is 
incomplete.  According to Westbrook, the fundamental failing of liberalism 
as applied to environmental problems is that liberalism’s focus on 
protecting personal autonomy prevents it from valuing the environment, 
because many environmental values cannot be analyzed in terms of personal 
autonomy.142  But environmentalism is not the only challenge to 
liberalism’s reliance on personal autonomy.  A liberal legal framework 
premised on personal autonomy arguably fails in virtually every context, 
because personal autonomy is not a fact but a social construct that ignores 
numerous social interdependencies.143  These interdependencies include, but 
are not limited to, environmental interdependence.  As such, Westbrook’s 
account fails to justify environmental law as a distinct legal field, instead of 
just another set of instances in which interdependence exposes the fallacy of 
personal autonomy on which liberalism is based. 
 Thus, neither Tarlock nor Westbrook achieves his objective of 
finding an organizational framework to cohere environmental law as a 
distinctive legal field.  I have been critical of both Tarlock’s and 
Westbrook’s explanations of environmental law on several points.  
Ultimately, however, my most fundamental disagreement with their 
approaches stems from their failure to identify what I have argued here are 
the essential attributes of a legal field:  a pattern of features that is common 
throughout the field and distinctive to the field.144  With that critique in 
mind, we can turn to my argument for a different framework for 
understanding environmental law as a legal field. 
B.  Defining Environmental Law 
In order to consider how we should think about environmental law 
as a legal field, we must first have some understanding of what the field of 
                                                 
141 See infra Part II.C.1-.3. 
142 Westbrook, supra note 5, at 92. 
143 See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY (2003); David R. Carlin, Jr., The Crusoe Fallacy:  Illusion of Personal 
Autonomy, COMMONWEAL, Feb. 14, 1997; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A 
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 (1984). 
144 Cf. Hunter, supra note 18, at 20 (criticizing other frameworks proposed for health law 
on the ground that they “omit[] too much of what constitutes the core of health law”). 
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environmental law might encompass, of the scope of situations we wish to 
characterize with our organizational framework.  Although everyone 
probably has some intuitive sense of the meaning of the term environmental 
law, it is not self-defining.  Some laws—for example, pollution statutes like 
the Clean Water Act145 and Clean Air Act146—obviously fall within the 
definition.  But what about laws governing natural resources, such as the 
statutes governing management of public lands?147  These laws reflect a 
consideration of the need to conserve and to preserve elements of the 
natural environment, but they also intentionally facilitate the exploitation of 
natural resources, even at the cost of some environmental degradation.  Are 
such laws environmental?  What about laws that do not necessarily reflect 
any consideration of the environment, yet may have significant 
environmental effects—for example, tax subsidies that encourage the 
purchase of sport utility vehicles with low fuel efficiencies or laws 
regulating rail freight rates?148  Some statutes exhibit an obvious overall 
orientation toward protecting the environment, yet include specific 
provisions that do not share this goal, and in fact may be intended to 
sacrifice environmental protection to satisfy some other, opposing 
interest.149  Other statutes do not exhibit an overall orientation toward 
protecting the environment, but include specific provisions that do reflect a 
goal of environmental protection.150  Which of these are environmental law 
and which are not?  In order to answer that question, we first must decide 
what we mean to accomplish by classifying a legal rule as environmental.  
For this Article, I am interested in how the legal classification 
environmental law illuminates the functioning of the law.151  In other words, 
my focus is on legal rules that are environmental in a way that somehow 
affects the substance of the rule or of its applications. 
                                                 
145 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387. 
146 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q. 
147 See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785. 
148 See I.R.C. §  280F (allowing greater tax deduction for sport utility vehicles than for 
other cars); id. § 4064 (applying an excise tax to domestic sales of cars that do not satisfy 
fuel economy standards, but exempting cars that weigh more than 6000 pounds); United 
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 
(1973) (reviewing environmental group’s challenge to Interstate Commerce Commission’s 
approval of rail freight increases). 
149 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 125, 42 U.S.C. § 7425 (authorizing rules or orders prohibiting 
certain air pollution sources “from using fuels other than locally or regionally available 
coal or coal derivatives”). 
150 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2378 (requiring military procurement of copier paper to contain 
specified percentages of post-consumer recycled content); Pub. L. No. 106-181, Title I, 
§ 157, 114 Stat. 89 (2000) (directing the Federal Aviation Administration to study the use 
of recycled materials in pavement used for runways, taxiways, and aprons). 
151 See infra Part II.A. 
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 A surprising amount of scholarship discusses and theorizes about 
environmental law without defining the scope of the term.  Some authors, 
however, have offered definitions, which fall into three main types.  The 
most expansive definitions include all laws that affect the physical 
environment.152  Other definitions restrict environmental law to laws that 
are enacted for the purpose, or the primary purpose, of protecting the natural 
environment.153  The narrowest definitions include only laws that reflect an 
environmentalist ethic.154 
 In choosing a useful definition for environmental law, the challenge 
is to balance overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness.  An overinclusive 
definition risks depriving the term of meaning.  Employed expansively, 
environmental “may seem uselessly broad, describing nothing in 
particular.” 155  If environmental law includes all laws that affect the natural 
environment, then virtually every law could fall within the definition, 
because almost every law affects human behavior, and almost every human 
behavior affects the natural environment in some respect.156  An 
                                                 
152 See Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
63, 64 n.2 (2003) (“I use the term environmental law to describe the vast realm of law, 
largely statutory, that addresses human actions affecting the rest of the natural world.”); 
Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. 
L.J. 211, 262 (2002-2003) (“Environmental law can be generally defined as the law 
governing the relationships of humans to the biophysical environment.”). 
153 See U.S.-Can.-Mex. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 
14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480, art. 45.2(a) (defining “environmental law” as any statute or 
regulation “the primary purpose of which is the protection of the environment, or the 
prevention of danger to human life or health”); CRAIG N. JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL 
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (2d ed. 2007) (“Environmental Law is law designed 
to protect the environment, and the plants and animals that rely on it, including us.”); 
Michael C. Blumm, Studying Environmental Law: A Brief Overview and Readings for a 
Seminar, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 309, 310 (1992) (“Environmental 
law is a loose amalgam of common law and (increasingly) statutory provisions designed to 
protect public health, ecosystems, and dependent and plant species.”); LAZARUS, supra 
note 2, at 1 (“[E]nvironmental law regulates human activity in order to limit ecological 
impacts that threaten public health and biodiversity.”). 
154 See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental “Rule of Law” Litigation, 19 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 575, 576 (2002) (defining environmental law as “the positive and common 
law that reflects environmentalism,” which Tarlock in turn defines as “an emerging 
philosophy or value system which posits that we living humans should assume science-
based ethical stewardship obligations to conserve natural systems for ourselves as well as 
for future generations”) (footnotes omitted). 
155 ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY:  NATURE, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY 5 (3d ed. 2004); see also Tarlock, supra note 10, at 221 (“[T]he term 
‘environmental’ has become so all-encompassing that it has been robbed of any operative 
meaning; it needs contours.”). 
156 See Kim Diana Connolly, The Ecology of Breastfeeding, 13 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 
157, 157, 164 (2008) (arguing that “laws that support breastfeeding should be considered 
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overinclusive definition also diverges from common understandings of the 
term environmental law.  Definitions generally should match common 
usage.157  A definition of environmental law that includes laws that may 
affect the natural environment, but that were enacted without any conscious 
consideration of the environment—for example, the aforementioned tax 
subsidies that encourage the purchase of sport utility vehicles with low fuel 
efficiencies—would diverge from what most people understand 
environmental law to entail, and likely thereby would lead to confusion.   
Moreover, such laws raise a different set of issues than laws that 
consciously consider the environment.  For laws enacted without any 
conscious consideration of the environment, the primary issue from an 
environmental law perspective is the threshold question whether the 
environment should factor into the lawmaking institutions’ considerations.  
For laws that reflect a conscious consideration of the environment, the 
question is quite different, albeit not unrelated:  how does the environment 
factor into the lawmaking institutions’ considerations?  This leads to a set of 
follow-up questions—such as what are the relevant policy tradeoffs, what 
values and interests do the lawmaking institutions bring to bear to resolve 
those tradeoffs, and what legal doctrine is produced as a result of those 
choices—that never arise with environmental laws that do not reflect 
consideration of the environment.  This fundamental difference between the 
two categories suggests the usefulness of a classification that distinguishes 
between them instead of lumping them together. 
 Narrowing the definition of environmental law to include only laws 
that focus primarily on protecting the environment or that reflect an 
environmentalist ethic, on the other hand, ignores a crucially important 
feature of environmental law:  the inherent and pervasive tradeoffs in 
environmental decisionmaking.158  As a result of these tradeoffs, 
environmental protection is almost never the only or overriding purpose of a 
law that applies to the environment.  Indeed, environmental law is better 
understood as a field in which the goal of environmental protection sits in a 
position of constant tension with countervailing interests and values.  
Environmental laws always reflect a balance of objectives, and envisioning 
environmental law as exclusively or primarily devoted to environmental 
protection would counterproductively obscure the essential question of how 
                                                                                                                            
environmental laws” because such law reduce “the negative environmental impacts of 
production and distribution of artificial baby milk”) 
157 See Solove, supra note 52, at 1096 (noting that theorists attempting to define privacy 
will “examine whether a conception of privacy includes the things we view as private and 
excludes the things we do not”); see also id. (“A few things might be left out, but the aim is 
to establish a conception that encompasses most of things that are commonly viewed under 
the rubric of ‘privacy.’ ”). 
158 See infra Part II.C. 
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to balance among competing goals and interests that include, but are not 
limited to, environmental protection. 
The best approach to defining environmental law—the approach that 
appropriately balances overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness—
encompasses laws that reflect a consideration of human impacts on the 
natural environment.  This definition is not limited to laws enacted for the 
primary purpose of protecting the environment, but also does not include 
laws that unintentionally affect the environment.  Thus, for example, natural 
resource laws that prescribe both conservation and exploitation should be 
considered environmental laws, whereas tax subsidies that encourage the 
purchase of sport utility vehicles with low fuel efficiencies should not be 
considered environmental laws.  Defining environmental law to encompass 
laws that reflect a consideration of human impacts on the natural 
environment will allow us to study the various approaches that lawmaking 
institutions take to environmental management.159 
                                                 
159 This definition is not, however, unproblematic.  In particular, it fails to illuminate fully 
another core characteristic of environmental problems:  the pervasiveness of the 
relationship between human activities and the natural environment.  The allocation of 
government spending between mass transit and roadways, for example, may significantly 
affect whether individuals decide to take mass transit or drive, with concomitant effects on 
the environment.  But transportation funding legislation, unless enacted in part to address 
environmental impacts, would generally not be considered part of environmental law.  
Some provisions of federal pollution statutes, on the other hand, may have little if any real 
environmental impact. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 513, 33 U.S.C. § 1372 (setting forth 
labor standards for laborers and mechanics employed by contractors or subcontractors 
working on water treatment works funded by Clean Water Act grants).  If we are to use the 
category of environmental law to think critically about the relationship between law and 
the environment, we need to examine that relationship both where it is intentional and 
where it is unintentional.  To include every minor provision of the Clean Water Act within 
the definition of environmental law, but to exclude laws not aimed at the environment but 
which may have far greater environmental impacts, somewhat misallocates our attention.  
Excluding laws that have inadvertent environmental impacts from the definition of 
environmental law creates a problematic divide between the study of environmental 
problems and environmental law. 
Rather than expanding the definition of environmental law to include all laws that 
are relevant to the physical environment, which would implicate the aforementioned 
drawbacks of overinclusiveness, an additional supplementary category can be employed to 
describe laws that significantly affect the environment but that do not reflect a conscious 
consideration of environmental impacts:  indirect environmental law or unintentional 
environmental law.  Although laws that reflect a conscious consideration of human impacts 
on the environment always will form the core of environmental law practice, teaching, and 
scholarship, unintentional environmental law merits greater attention than it usually 
receives from environmental lawyers, teachers, and scholars.  See, e.g., MICHAEL 
SHELLENBERGER & TED NORDHAUS, THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM:  GLOBAL 
WARMING POLITICS IN A POST-ENVIRONMENTAL WORLD 20 (2004) (noting that David 
Brower advocated “the need for the environmental community to invest more energy in 
changing the tax code”).  Excluding indirect environmental law from the category of 
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C.  Factual Context 
Having defined what environmental law encompasses, we can turn 
to constructing an organizational framework that coheres environmental law 
as a field.  Because my objective is to find an understanding of how 
environmental law functions, my approach will be primarily descriptive 
rather than prescriptive.  To construct our organizational framework, we 
will address each of the underlying constitutive dimensions of 
environmental law—factual context, policy tradeoffs, values and interests, 
and legal doctrine—beginning with factual context.  Our goal, as Part I 
established, is to identify core characteristics of environmental problems 
that, in combination, are both common and distinct to environmental law.  I 
propose two such characteristics:  (1) physical public resources; and (2) 
pervasive interrelatedness.  From these two core characteristics follow other 
characteristics that also are important to the factual context of 
environmental law:  temporal and spatial disjunction, and the cruciality yet 
unattainability of detailed scientific information.  Moreover, these core 
characteristics help to explain the recurring tradeoffs that arise in 
environmental law. 
1.  Physical Public Resources   
Environmental problems involve a physical resource that is in 
important senses publicly rather than privately valued, owned, and/or 
controlled.  Public lands, including but not limited to lands designated for 
preservation, are an obvious example of such a resource.  The government 
holds title to the lands and controls the use of the lands on behalf of the 
public.160  Public lands also often are associated with public values, such as 
a collective desire for open space, although they also may have value for 
individual uses as well.  Air, water, and wildlife are other examples of 
environmental physical public resources.  Although ownership may be less 
clear than with public lands, they are not wholly privately owned and 
controlled.161  More abstractly, environmental values such as picturesque 
                                                                                                                            
environmental law hinders the insight that many indirect environmental laws should be 
direct environmental laws—that is, where environmental effects of a law are significant, 
they arguably should be managed consciously. 
160 See Adell Louise Amos, The Use of State Instream Flow Laws for Federal Lands: 
Respecting State Control While Meeting Federal Purposes, 36 ENVTL. L. 1237, 1280 
(2006) (“[F]ederal public lands are managed and the waters are protected for the benefit of 
the public.”); see also generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural 
Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
161 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335 (1979); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 
256 (1946) (declining to recognize private property rights to airspace); Michael C. Blumm 
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views and biodiversity resemble public resources with a physical 
component.  They arise as a collective result of individual action, and are 
enjoyed collectively by the public as well. 
The interrelationship among uses of public resources, and the 
special difficulties with attempting to regulate conflicts among uses in the 
environmental context, lie at the heart of all problems that arise in 
environmental law.162  Wanting clean air or wanting to burn coal to generate 
electricity are not themselves environmental problems; the problem is when 
those uses conflict, when some people want clean air and others (or even 
the same people) want to pollute the air to generate electricity.163   
Some of the difficulties with addressing use conflicts in 
environmental law are not distinct to the environmental context, but rather 
arise in many common-resource situations.  Public resources pose 
difficulties in a society like ours organized around an economic system 
based on markets and private property and around a political and legal 
system based on individual rights.  When individuals have unregulated 
access to public resources, they tend to overuse them, because each 
individual user enjoys the full benefits of her use, whereas the costs of her 
use are shared among everyone who uses or benefits from, or could use or 
benefit from, the resource.164  Management of public resources therefore 
requires collective action among or on behalf of the users and beneficiaries 
to limit use of the resource to optimal levels.165  The difficulties of 
instituting collective action have been widely noted.166  Individual users 
                                                                                                                            
& Lucas Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as 
Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 352-53 (2005); Dave Owen, 
Law, Environmental Dynamism, Reliability: The Rise and Fall of CalFed, 37 ENVTL. L. 
1145, 1179 (2007) (noting that, “water rights users may own usufructuary rights, but the 
state owns the water and watercourses, and holds the latter as trustee for its people”) 
(footnotes omitted) [find wildlife cite]. 
162 I intentionally elide here any distinction between use and non-use valuation of 
environmental resources.  In particular, I employ the term “use” expansively, to include 
values such as preservation that do not necessarily involve any physical presence or 
involvement at the resource in question.  For example, I would count an appreciation of the 
existence of wildlands in their pristine condition as a use of the wildlands. 
163 Cf. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. ECON. 1 (1960). 
164 See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968); Barton 
H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult:  The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 
ENVTL. L. 241, 242 (2000).  Economists refer to this effect as a negative externality 
(because the individual does not face the full costs of his or her action) or the tragedy of the 
commons (referring to the incentive to overuse public resources). 
165 See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 
574-75 (2001). 
166 See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC 
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (rev. ed. 1971); 
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must be convinced of their interest in the public resource and of the need for 
management to limit its use.167  The greater the number and variation in 
users, the greater the difficulty of attempting to organize them into 
collective action.168  Organizing requires a leader who is willing to “bear the 
costs of organization and focus the attention of a diffuse, disconnected 
collection of individuals.”169  Individual users of the public resource, who 
continue to have a strong incentive to free ride on the efforts of others, are 
likely to resist efforts to limit their use of a public resource, even if they 
recognize the need for limits on overall use.170 
In addition to these standard difficulties of instituting collective 
action to regulate a common resource, several characteristics of 
environmental public resources make them particularly difficult to manage 
or to regulate collectively.  First, the environment, in its many forms, is 
traditionally an unregulated public resource, often associated with long 
traditions and customs of relatively uninhibited exploitation and open 
access.171  Users perceive these traditions and customs as conferring an 
entitlement and accordingly often strongly resist efforts to limit their uses of 
                                                                                                                            
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:  THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 1990). 
167 See Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 770 
(2008) (“Similarly situated citizens may act in disparate ways that collectively lead to the 
least preferred outcome, because they do not see, or at least do not prioritize, the 
commonalities among them. They may fall victim to preference cycling in which even 
those with similar preferences may struggle to achieve lasting agreement.”). 
168 See Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515, 
527 (2007); George J. Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories 
of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. SCI. 359, 360-62 (1974). 
169 Kang, supra note 167, at 770; see also HARDIN, supra note 166, at 35-37 (noting the 
need for political entrepreneurs “who, for their own career reasons, find it in their private 
interest to work to provide collective benefits to relevant groups”). 
170 See Ostrom, supra note 166, at 36; Stigler, supra note 168.  Dan Kahan has criticized 
some of the precepts of collective action literature, arguing that empirical social science 
shows that, “[i]n collective-action settings, individuals adopt not a materially calculating 
posture but rather a richer, more emotionally nuanced reciprocal one.”  Dan M. Kahan, The 
Logic of Reciprocity:  Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003).  
According to Kahan, individuals will willingly contribute to collective action when they 
trust that others “will voluntarily respond in kind.”  Id. at 72.  As applied to public 
resources that are widely used in relative anonymity, however, the results of Kahan’s 
framework do not necessarily diverge from the results of conventional public choice 
analysis.  In particular, where the users are numerous and varied, and can free ride in 
relative anonymity, building the requisite trust among users is likely to be difficult. 
171 Cf. Peter Manus, Our Environmental Rebels:  An Average American Law Professor’s 
Perspective on Environmental Advocacy and the Law, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 499, 518 
(2006) (“The American jural system is based on a fundamental presumption that people 
bear no moral duties to refrain from exploiting the environment . . . .”). 
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the environment.172  Second, environmental public resources often have 
extremely numerous, valuable, and varied uses, which increases the 
probability and intractability of conflicts among users and decreases the 
likelihood of effective collective action.  Third, the numerousness of users 
and the often complex lines of causation that create interrelationships 
among uses mean that, when conflicts among uses arise, it can be 
exceedingly difficult or impossible for any user harmed by the conflict to 
trace her harm to any particular other user or beneficiary.173  Fourth, the 
same factors—numerous users and complex causation—make it relatively 
easy for users to ignore, or not to recognize, their causal role in affecting 
another use.  Fifth, the objectives of regulating the environment are often 
difficult to evaluate, because they are not valued either economically as the 
subject of traditional market transactions or politically as the subject of 
traditional individual rights.174  This is especially true where, as is often the 
case, environmental harms are difficult to perceive and to measure and 
where the benefits associated with protecting the environment involve 
existence value rather than use value, or (even more so) intrinsic value 
independent of utility or tangible benefit to humans. 
As an illustration of some of these difficulties, take the example of 
waterways such as rivers or lakes.  Waterways are subject to many and 
varied uses, including public water system sources, irrigation sources, 
pollution sinks, navigation, flood control, recreation, and aesthetic pleasure.  
For many major waterways, thousands or millions of individuals and 
businesses partake in or benefit from one or more of these uses.  Potential 
conflicts among the uses, and among prospective users of the same use, are 
obvious.  Polluted waterways are more difficult to use for safe drinking 
                                                 
172 See, e.g., Ray Rasker, Wilderness for Its Own Sake or as Economic Asset?, 25 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 15, 15 (2005) (“[I]n the remote corners of the rural West, with a 
long history of dependence on public lands for mining, energy development and logging, 
the idea of setting aside land for conservation is seen as a direct affront to the well-being of 
local residents.”); see also Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCI. 280, 281 (1987) 
(“Strong initial views are resistant to change because they influence the way that 
subsequent information is interpreted.”). 
173 See LAZARUS, supra note 2, at 33 (“due to the highly interrelated nature of the 
ecosystem, it is almost always a mistake to suppose that one can isolate a single discrete 
cause as the source of an environmental problem”); Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s 
Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 
747 (2000) (“[E]nvironmental harms are more typically the cumulative and synergistic 
result of multiple actions, often spread over significant time and space. This is primarily 
traceable to the sharing inherent in any common natural resource base, which is the object 
of so many simultaneous and sporadic actions over time and space.”). 
174 Cf. Lazarus, supra note 173, at  747 (“Many of the ecological injuries resulting from 
environmental degradation are not readily susceptible to monetary valuation and have a 
distinctively nonhuman character.”). 
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water and less desirable for recreation; and water used for irrigation is 
unavailable for other uses.  The canoeist whose enjoyment of the waterway 
is impaired by the stench emanating from its polluted waters, however, may 
find it difficult to attribute that harm to any particular pollution source.  But 
the difficulties of the sole canoeist pale in comparison to those of a 
regulator faced with an overwhelming number of desired uses of a resource, 
connected by a complex web of interrelationships that create a dizzying 
array of conflicts and synergies. 
2.  Pervasive Interrelatedness 
Everything in the environment, including humans, is part of a 
pervasively interrelated ecological system.175  This pervasive 
interrelatedness sometimes is referred to as the First Law of Ecology.176  
The media of these interrelationships frequently are the physical public 
resources that comprise the environment—for example, a river that carries 
nitrates from the fertilizers a farmer applies to his fields downstream to a 
tadpole that experiences developmental deformities from nitrate exposure.  
The interrelatedness creates connections that can cross great physical 
distance and time.  Air pollutants emitted into the air in Asia drift across the 
Pacific Ocean to California.177  Smoking and asbestos exposure have a 
synergistic interaction, resulting in a greater risk of lung cancer than what 
can be attributed to the separate effects of smoking and asbestos.178  
                                                 
175 See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of 
Uniform Standards and ‘Fine-Tuning’ Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1273 
(1985); Kelly Nolen, Residents at Risk: Wildlife and the Bureau of Land Management's 
Planning Process, 26 ENVTL. L. 771, 779 (1996) (“Animals and plants within an ecosystem 
are intricately interrelated, and the decline of any one species may have serious effects on 
the balance of the entire system, with unexpected consequences for humans.”). 
176 See, e.g., BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN, AND TECHNOLOGY 
33-38 (1971); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law in the Political Ecosystem--Coping 
with the Reality of Politics, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 480 n.77 (2002); see also 
PLATER ET AL., supra note 155, at 5 (“The environmental perspective . . . starts from the 
premise of interconnectedness--that all human enterprises exist within one vast shared 
common context in which actions have collateral consequences that are relevant and should 
be considered.”); see also id. at xxx (“As the First Law of Ecology says, everything is 
connected to everything else.”); id. at 5 (“the environmental perspective conceptualizes all 
human enterprises existing within one large system of interconnected systems”). 
177 See Andrew Jacobs, U.N. Reports Pollution Threat in Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2008. 
178 See Thomas C. Erren et al., Synergy Between Asbestos and Smoking on Lung Cancer 
Risks, 10 EPIDEMIOLOGY 405 (1999); see also Jun Peng, Iron and Paraquat as Synergistic 
Environmental Risk Factors in Sporadic Parkinson’s Disease Accelerate Age-Related 
Neurodegeneration, 27 J. NEUROSCIENCE 6914 (2007) (reporting findings suggesting that 
increased oral intake of iron in the neonatal period and environmental exposure to the 
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Organochlorine compounds accumulate in animal lipid tissue over time, 
affecting development and reproduction.179   
The pervasive interrelatedness among elements of the environment 
makes the environment a highly complex system that often is exceedingly 
difficult to manage.  As we have seen, the objective of environmental law is 
to resolve conflicts among uses.  The complexity and pervasive 
interrelatedness of the environment, however, make it extremely difficult to 
decide which activities need to be regulated to what extent in order to 
achieve a desired balance.  Any particular impact on a use of a resource 
may arise from numerous, difficult-to-identify causal events.  Conversely, 
every event may contribute to numerous, difficult-to-identify impacts.  
Pervasive interrelatedness thus contributes to the extraordinarily complex 
lines of causation that often characterize environmental problems.  It may 
be difficult or impossible to determine with any precision a particular 
action’s innumerable causes and effects that ripple throughout the 
environment.  Not surprisingly, unintended consequences are a recurring 
phenomenon in environmental law.180  
                                                                                                                            
pesticide paraquat have a synergistic effect on increasing the risk of neurodegeneration 
associated with Parkinson’s disease). 
179 See Karen A. Glennemeier & Linda J. Begnoche, Impact of Organochlorine 
Contamination on Amphibian Populations in Southwestern Michigan, 36 J. HERPETOLOGY 
233, 233 (2002). 
180 See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Marketing Biodiversity, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 421, 425 (2002) 
(noting that domestic environmental regulation of industry may export environmental 
degradation to other countries); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: 
The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 814 
(2003) (noting the problem of “media-shifting,” in which “pollution-control laws 
protecting one environmental medium (for example, air, water, or land) . . . generat[e] . . . 
pollution in alternative media”); Erin Ryan, New Orleans, the Chesapeake, and the Future 
of Environmental Assessment: Overcoming the Natural Resources Law of Unintended 
Consequences, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 981, 984 (2006) (noting that, when “Virginia resource 
managers attempted to protect intertidal wetlands by establishing a development-free 
jurisdictional boundary . . . landowners then built all the way to the legal side of the line, 
. . . [which] inadvertently doomed the protected wetlands by disconnecting them from the 
natural shoreline systems that sustain them during such periods of sea-level rise” and 
thereby “accomplished the exact opposite of what policymakers had hoped for.”); David 
Sunding & David Zilberman,  Consideration of Economics under California's Porter-
Cologne Act, 13 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 73, 96 (2007) (“Water quality 
regulation that aims to improve environmental quality can have unintended consequences 
that harm the environment and natural resources. The reallocation of water from one 
location to another, to meet water quality regulation, may reduce the well-being of fish and 
wildlife dependent on the water in the source region. Reduction of use of chemical 
pesticides that reduce farm productivity may lead to an increase in utilized land and 
expansion of the utilized land base to wilderness areas. Diversion of water resources to 
meet environmental quality objectives may reduce the capacity to utilize this water in 
provision of environmental amenities.”). 
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3.  Secondary Characteristics 
The core characteristics of environmental problems—physical 
public resources and pervasive interrelatedness—give rise to other, 
secondary characteristics that also are important for understanding 
environmental law. 
Temporal and Spatial Disjunctions.  The pervasive interrelatedness 
among elements of the environment create complex lines of causation that 
often span considerable distance and time.  These effects can lead to 
temporal and spatial disjunctions that are important to environmental 
decisionmaking.  Common examples of such disjunction include the 
discharge-exposure disjunction, wherein a pollutant discharged into the 
environment may travel a great distance and/or over a long time before 
exposing a person, animal, or plant.  Polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”), 
for example, which are highly toxic synthetic organic chemicals 
manufactured in the United States from 1929 until 1977, do not readily 
break down in the environment and therefore can persist for years, carried 
throughout the globe in a series of cycles of volatilization into the 
atmosphere and then redeposition to the surface.181  Another example of a 
disjunction is an exposure-effect disjunction, wherein an adverse health 
effect may not manifest itself for months, years, or even decades after a 
person is exposed to an environmental hazard.182  Individuals exposed to 
asbestos, for example, may not contract mesothelioma for 20 to 50 years 
after their exposure.183  A cost-benefit disjunction arises where, as is often 
true, the benefits for a use of the environment are experienced immediately 
but the costs are not experienced until much later.184 
These disjunctions create difficulties for environmental lawmaking.  
Environmental effects manifest themselves over a much broader expanse of 
space and time than human thought and institutions typically consider in 
their decisionmaking; it is in many respects still unclear whether humans 
                                                 
181 See AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE 
FOR POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS 1-3, 479, 481 (2000). 
182 See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1237 (2002) (“the injuries to human health 
and the environment of particular substances may take years to manifest themselves”). 
183 See A. Chovil & C. Stewart,  Latency Period for Mesothelioma, 314 LANCET 853 
(1979).    
184 See Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational 
Distributive Justice And Efficiency, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 79, 110 n.63 (noting that “greater 
use of natural resources or degradation of the environment [sometimes] produces 
immediate benefits but long-term costs”). 
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have the capacity to understand and plan over the area and time that are 
required for effective environmental lawmaking.185   
Scientific Uncertainty.  Numerous scientific questions underlie any 
environmental problem.  The standard approach to regulation calls for 
regulating an activity in order to reduce or to avoid the harm that it can 
cause.186  For environmental problems, the link between a harm and its 
cause(s) runs through the medium of an ecological system comprised of a 
complex web of pervasively interrelated constituent elements.  The 
pervasive interrelatedness among components of the natural environment 
and the temporal and spatial disjunction between the causes and effects of 
environmental disruption are extremely complicating factors that make 
environmental effects much more difficult to predict, or even to ascertain 
retrospectively. 187  Often these questions are at the frontiers of science, 
arising in areas in which we have little empirical data and little 
understanding of the natural interactions and processes.  Policymakers look 
to science to untangle that web, but there is never complete scientific 
information.  The combined cruciality and inevitability of scientific 
uncertainty creates a circumstance in which a thorough understanding of 
environmental problems is both highly important and yet wholly 
unattainable.  As a result, environmental law requires decisionmaking in a 
context of great scientific uncertainty.188 
                                                 
185 See Richard J. Lazarus, Human Nature, the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of 
Environmental Law, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 231, 239 (2005) (“The need for environmental law 
can be seen as arising from the persistent gap between the spatial and temporal horizons of 
human nature and the much wider and longer spatial and temporal dimensions of the 
consequences of human activities because of the laws of nature.”); see also Holly 
Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 295, 318-19 
(2003) (identifying the durability-flexibility dilemma:  because environmental problems 
often develop over extended periods of time, environmental policies “must be durable over 
unusually long periods of time” yet also must be “flexible enough to respond to new 
information and changing conditions”). 
186 See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal Lands III: Regulation of Solid 
and Hazardous Waste Management, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 54 (1994) (“Obviously, the 
purpose of most environmental regulation is to prevent environmental harm and adverse 
effects on human health.”). 
187 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 185, at 240 (“the further that the laws of nature spread 
cause and effect out over time and space, the more scientific uncertainty there will be 
regarding whether the adverse environmental effects projected in the future will in fact ever 
happen and whether the adverse environmental effects perceived today were in fact caused 
by specific activities in distant locations and times.”). 
188 See Doremus, supra note 185, at 318-19; Daniel A. Farber, Building Bridges Over 
Troubled Waters: Eco-Pragmatism and the Environmental Prospect, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
851, 855 (2003); Robert L. Glicksman, Balancing Mandate and Discretion in the 
Institutional Design of Federal Climate Change Policy, 102 NW. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 196 
(2008); Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of 
 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS A LEGAL FIELD 51 
4.  Other Characteristics 
I am not the first to identify fundamental characteristics of 
environmental law.  For example, Richard Lazarus has argued that the 
“common denominator” unifying environmental law is the concept of 
ecological injury, which in turn implicates certain “recurring features” of 
the factual context of environmental law.189  Lazarus identifies six such 
features:  (1) “Irreversible, Catastrophic, and Continuing Injury”; (2) 
“Physically Distant Injury”; (3) “Temporally Distant Injury”; (4) 
“Uncertainty and Risk”; (5) “Multiple Causes”; and (6) “Noneconomic, 
Nonhuman Character.”190  These features of ecological injury, in turn, result 
in environmental laws that exhibit the “dominant characteristics” of 
“complexity, scientific uncertainty, dynamism, precaution, and 
controversy.”191  And Holly Doremus has identified “four distinctive 
features [of environmental problems] that make them especially 
intractable”:  (1) “high levels of uncertainty”; (2) “conflicts between 
socially contested yet strongly held values”; (3) the necessity of collective 
action; and (4) the necessity of durable yet flexible solutions.192   
The characteristics Lazarus and Doremus describe are important and 
recurring characteristics in environmental law.  But I would argue that the 
core characteristics I have identified—physical public resources and 
pervasive interrelatedness—are in the nature of independent, primary 
features, from which Lazarus’s and Doremus’s characteristics derive.  
Accordingly, Lazarus’s and Doremus’s characteristics overlap considerably 
with what I am calling secondary characteristics of environmental law.  
Thus, for example, although Lazarus and Doremus are undoubtedly correct 
that uncertainty is prevalent in environmental policymaking, uncertainty is 
not distinctive to the environment, but rather pervasive in many facets of 
life and therefore many legal fields.193  Moreover, the uncertainty in 
environmental decisionmaking is largely attributable to the pervasive 
                                                                                                                            
Environmental Law:  Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2420 
(1995); Richard J. Lazarus, Survey Says: Court Doesn't Get It, 17 ENVTL. F. 44, 45 (2000); 
Lazarus, supra note 173, at 747. 
189 Lazarus, supra note 173, at 745. 
190 Id. at 745-48. 
191 LAZARUS, supra note 2, at 16. 
192 Doremus, supra note 185, at 318-19. 
193 See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostritsky, Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations and the 
Holdup Problem, 61 SMU L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2008) (“The problem of uncertainty is 
pervasive in all contract negotiations.”); Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under 
Risk-Based Rules, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1181, 1262 (2008) (“[R]elational tax planning is 
surrounded by pervasive uncertainty.”). 
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interrelationships that comprise ecological systems.194  For my purpose of 
understanding environmental law as a distinctive legal field, therefore, it is 
better to focus on the core characteristic that gives rise to the uncertainty 
that Lazarus and Doremus note.195 
D.  Policy Tradeoffs 
The factual context in which environmental law operates—physical 
public resources subject to numerous uses connected by an intricate web of 
pervasive interrelationships—creates certain key policy tradeoffs that frame 
lawmaking choices.  To date, the dominant paradigm has framed these 
tradeoffs as pitting economic welfare against environmental protection.  
The economy-environment tradeoff can be a powerful lens.  It accounts for 
much of the politics of environmental lawmaking, in which environmental 
groups (representing “the environment”) pursue regulation and the 
regulated community (representing “the economy”) fights it.  Moreover, 
there is certainly some factual truth to the economy-environment tradeoff; 
many environmental laws are quite costly.196  For these reasons and others, 
it sometimes will be appropriate and helpful to cast the principal tradeoff in 
environmental lawmaking as economics versus environment. 
The economics-environment tradeoff is, however, an 
oversimplifying generalization.  The realities of the environmental 
decisionmaking context are more complicated and more nuanced than 
economics versus environment indicates, and therefore looking at 
environmental decisionmaking solely or principally through the lens of the 
economy-environment tradeoff obscures important insights into 
environmental lawmaking.  The principal problem with the economy-
environment tradeoff is that economic interests and environmental 
protection are not as monolithic, nor as oppositional, as the tradeoff 
suggests. 
First, environmental protection itself provides numerous economic 
benefits.  Cleaner air is associated with various benefits with economic 
value, such as reduced health care costs for treating respiratory difficulties.  
The decision whether to allow additional air pollution therefore poses a 
                                                 
194 See LAZARUS, supra note 2, at 19 (tracing scientific uncertainty in environmental 
lawmaking to “the elaborate intricacies of the workings of the natural environment”). 
195 Lazarus and Doremus compiled their lists for purposes other than defining 
environmental law as a distinctive legal field, and the differences between our lists may be 
attributable to our differing purposes rather than to any disagreement. 
196 See, e.g., EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO 1990 at ES-2 
(1997) (reporting that the direct costs of implementing the Clean Air Act from 1970 to 
1990 totaled $523 billion). 
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tradeoff not just between economic benefits and environmental benefits, but 
also between conflicting economic benefits:  the benefits from using the air 
as a waste sink and the benefits of reduced health care costs from cleaner 
air.  Conflicting economic benefits also arise from temporal tradeoffs, as 
using an environmental resource in a particular way at one time may 
preclude the same use later.  For example, pumping groundwater from an 
underground aquifer to use for irrigating farmland may preclude or limit 
later use of the aquifer.  Thus, in many situations, environmental lawmaking 
poses a tradeoff among different economic benefits. 
Second, environmental protection also is not as monolithic as the 
economy-environment tradeoff suggests.  Different uses that we commonly 
associate with environmental protection may conflict in a particular 
situation.  Hiking, camping, and other recreational uses may impair the 
quality of plant and wildlife habitat.  Ecosystem restoration may require the 
elimination or reduction of non-native plants and wildlife.  Filtering out 
pollutants from wastewater or air emissions may generate solid wastes.  
Regulating industrial activity more stringently in California may induce 
new industrial activity in other states.  Thus, in many situations, 
environmental lawmaking poses a tradeoff among different environmental 
benefits. 
These economic-economic tradeoffs and environment-environment 
tradeoffs are as important to understanding the problems that arise in 
environmental law as the economic-environment tradeoff.  Thus, as a frame 
for analyzing environmental lawmaking, the economics-environment 
tradeoff overgeneralizes and oversimplifies to an extent that limits its 
explanatory power.  Thinking about environmental law in terms of economy 
versus environment may simplify the issues, but it does so without enough 
benefit.  It does not, for example, illuminate any clear patterns in 
environmental law doctrine.197 
Rather than replacing the economy-environment tradeoff with 
another oversimplified generalization with similar shortcomings, consider 
the policy tradeoffs in environmental lawmaking more contextually.  
Thinking in terms of the various competing uses that can be made of 
environmental resources provides a promising analytical framework for 
studying environmental lawmaking.  The available options to manage an 
                                                 
197 See J.B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle in 
Environmental Law, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 523 (2000) (characterizing 
environmental lawmaking as a “war of annihilation” between “two extreme and opposing 
philosophies--one devoted to protecting the economy and the other to protecting the 
environment . . . that has left in its wake the mish-mash of laws, regulations, judicial 
opinions, and countless administrative decisions and policies that . . . has no agenda, no 
theme, no way of thinking” and “lacks any coherent philosophy”). 
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environmental resource can be determined by arranging all possible 
combinations of nonconflicting uses.  Each scenario, or combination of 
nonconflicting uses, is associated with a set of benefits that derive from 
those uses.  The differences among the different scenarios represent the 
tradeoffs posed by environmental lawmaking.  Thinking thusly in terms of 
use conflicts provides a coherent analytical framework for understanding 
environmental lawmaking. 
The idea of use conflicts is, of course, neither original to the Article 
nor unique to the environmental context.  Disputes over natural resources 
often are characterized in terms of use conflicts.198  And it was almost fifty 
years ago that Coase advocated what is essentially a use-conflict framework 
for a variety of land-use problems, including but not limited to 
environmental disputes.199  Generally, however, prior references to use 
conflicts, even in the environmental context, have not linked them to the 
distinctive characteristics of the environmental context:  physical public 
resources with pervasive interrelatedness.  In addition, prior references to 
use conflicts in environmental or natural resource law and policy generally 
have not extended the term to the full spectrum of benefits derived from 
environmental resources.  Appreciation of an environmental resource may 
not always involve an active or consumptive use of the resource, but it is a 
use nonetheless.200  Moreover, it is a use that includes a crucial physical 
component, in that appreciation of the environmental resource depends to a 
significant extent on the physical condition of the resource. 
Conceptualizing environmental law with an organizational 
framework that focuses on use conflicts carries several advantages over 
alternative frameworks.  First, thinking of environmental lawmaking in 
terms of use conflicts helpfully highlights the fundamental difficulties of the 
                                                 
198 See, e.g., McFarland v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing dispute 
over use of snowmobile on route within Yellowstone National Park as presenting problem 
of “use conflicts”); Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. United States Forest Service, 8 F.3d 713, 
719 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-
1687, “directs the [Forest] Service to manage conflicting uses of forest resources”) (citing 
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)); Mark O. Hatfield, The Nation Needs a Comprehensive Water 
Policy, 22 ENVTL. L. 792, 793 (1992) ( “Throughout this country, we are faced within 
increasing conflicts over the use of our natural resources.”) 
199 See Coase, supra note 163, at 2 (suggesting approaching the problem of contamination 
of a stream as a question whether to use the stream for fish habitat or as a waste sink) 
(citing GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 105 (1952)); see also Henry E. Smith, 
Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 1000 (2004) 
(“To Coase, the economic problem of externalities was essentially one of conflicting 
resource use.”).. 
200 Cf. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (D.C.Cir.1989) 
(“Option and existence values may represent ‘passive’ use, but they nonetheless reflect 
utility derived by humans from a resource . . . .”). 
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environmental context.  For example, environmental lawmaking requires 
lawmaking institutions to resolve tradeoffs among conflicting uses, but the 
immense complexity of the interrelationships in the environment renders 
our understanding of the environment incomplete and makes the precise 
nature of those tradeoffs difficult to ascertain.  Moreover, the pervasive 
interrelationships of the environment prevent lawmaking institutions from 
simplifying their decisionmaking by narrowing their focus. 
Second, unlike many frameworks that have been proposed for 
thinking about environmental law,201 a use-conflict framework does not 
assume any particular baseline by which to judge alternative legal 
arrangements.  Nor does a use-conflict framework favor any particular use 
of the environment as normatively superior.  Instead, a use-conflict 
framework provides a relatively value-neutral approach that facilitates a full 
comparison of alternatives.  As suits its objective as a descriptive 
framework, it does not favor any particular alternative, but rather provides a 
useful basis for evaluating alternatives by applying a normative framework, 
or even for evaluating alternative normative frameworks.  For example, a 
proponent of a social utility-maximization normative framework would 
favor choosing the legal rule associated with “the set of uses that maximizes 
the overall value of all resources.”202  
E.  Values and Interests 
Tradeoffs are only part of lawmaking; equally important are the 
values and interests that lawmaking institutions bring to bear on the relevant 
tradeoffs in order to make decisions that produce law.  As with the 
economy-environment tradeoff, we could frame our description of the 
values and interests in environmental lawmaking in terms of abstract 
generalizations:  environmental protection, distributional equity, equity, 
economic growth, freedom from regulation, and so forth.  But a descriptive 
analysis framed with abstract, generalized values and interests suffers from 
the same problems as the oversimplified generalization of the economy-
environment tradeoff.  We are unlikely to learn much about how 
environmental lawmaking functions by trying to discern whether 
lawmaking institutions value environmental protection in the abstract, or 
even whether lawmaking institutions value environmental protection 
comparatively more or less than some other abstract value, such as 
economic well-being.  To the contrary, our descriptive analysis of the 
                                                 
201 See, e.g., supra Part II.A.3 (criticizing Dan Tarlock’s and David Westbrook’s proposed 
frameworks on this ground). 
202 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 
965, 1000 (2004). 
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values and interests in environmental lawmaking becomes insightful when 
values and interests are framed specifically enough to tie them to specific 
uses of environmental resources.  For example, trying to determine whether 
the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) values sustainable 
fisheries in the abstract is unlikely to yield much concrete insight into the 
functioning of fisheries regulation.  But determining whether NMFS closes 
a fishery when necessary to preserve its long-term viability, over the 
objections of the fishing industry, provides useful information about the 
relevant values and interests, thereby helping us understand environmental 
lawmaking in a meaningful way.  Similarly, trying to determine whether the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) regulations promulgated 
pursuant to the Clean Air Act are efficient in the abstract is not as useful to 
understanding environmental lawmaking as evaluating the relative 
efficiency of policy options before EPA and determining why the agency 
sometimes chooses a less-efficient option.  Thus, as with tradeoffs, the 
values and interests associated with environmental lawmaking are best 
analyzed descriptively in reference to the potential uses of environmental 
resources, and the conflicts among those uses in particular. 
F.  Legal Doctrine 
As the Introduction noted, commenters have bemoaned the 
incoherence of environmental law as a body of legal doctrine.203  There do 
not appear to be any fundamental, unifying substantive principles that 
explain all of environmental law, and I will not propose any.  Rather, I want 
to make two interrelated points about the incoherence of environmental law 
doctrine.  First, the incoherence of environmental law provides fertile 
material for investigation and analysis.204 We have much to learn from 
environmental law’s incoherence, and incoherence can play a constructive 
role in the development of environmental law.  Second, although the 
substance of environmental law doctrine cannot be reduced to a few 
fundamental principles, this does not mean that environmental law lacks a 
conceptual core.  Organizational frameworks such as the one proposed in 
this Article, which focus on patterns in dimensions of environmental law 
other than legal doctrine, can provide a coherent understanding of 
environmental lawmaking. 
                                                 
203 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
204 Theodore Ruger has made a similar argument with respect to the incoherence of health 
law.  See Ruger, supra note 20, at 639 (contending that the “messiness and complexity” of 
health law “is part of what makes health law important and unique, and provides fertile 
terrain for generalized study”). 
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As to the benefits of environmental law’s incoherence:  There is a 
strong ad hoc, muddling-through character to environmental lawmaking as 
it has proceeded to date in this country.  In part, this may reflect an 
instability in values—a lack of societal consensus about how to manage our 
relationship with the natural environment.205  But the incoherence of 
environmental law runs deeper than an instability of values.  The 
incoherence reflects the ongoing struggles of environmental law; 
incoherence is a functional and productive reaction to the extreme 
difficulties environmental law confronts.  The factual characteristics of the 
environment—physical public resources subject to numerous, pervasively 
interrelated uses—give environmental problems a scale and complexity that 
severely taxes, and may even surpass, the abilities of human understanding.  
In the environmental lawmaking context, uncertainty is endemic.  
Lawmaking institutions respond to these challenges with an ad hoc mix of 
policies, struggling to find something that works.  Pragmatic 
experimentation necessarily produces incoherence. 
Moreover, some of what we perceive as incoherence in 
environmental law doctrine is actually variation, whether intentional or 
unintentional.  Different use conflicts create different tradeoffs and yield 
different environmental laws.  Regulatory approaches evolve over time as 
lawmaking institutions’ understanding of environmental problems, and of 
the effects of environmental policies, change.  When a policy approach does 
not function as intended, new approaches are tried.  There is no strong force 
pushing lawmaking institutions toward coherence in their approach to 
environmental problems, and, in light of the benefits of variation, it is not 
clear that this is such a bad thing. 
One understandably could ask whether, in the face of this 
incoherence (and variation), there is enough to hold environmental law 
together as a field.  I believe the answer is yes.  An analytical framework 
like the one set forth in this Article can cohere environmental lawmaking 
conceptually, even if it does not and cannot distill environmental law into 
coherent doctrine.  In this Article we have identified patterns along other 
dimensions of environmental law—in factual context, policy tradeoffs, and 
values and interests—that together provide a useful framework for 
analyzing and understanding the process of environmental lawmaking.  The 
relationship among these patterns can be represented with a conceptual 
diagram of environmental law, just as we earlier represented a conceptual 
diagram of a generic legal field: 
 
                                                 
205 Tarlock, supra note 10, at 223. 
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Figure 2:  Conceptual Diagram of Environmental Law 
 
 
Environmental problems share this conceptual pattern, but the 
substance of environmental problems—the specific tradeoffs and values at 
issue, and the legal doctrine that results from the application of those values 
and interests to those tradeoffs through lawmaking processes—depends 
heavily on specifics of context that vary from situation to situation and defy 
generalization. 
G.  Transcendence 
Can environmental law answer Judge Easterbrook’s challenge to 
cyberlaw,206 to which Lawrence Lessig responded in his Harvard Law 
Review article,207 by yielding any distinctive yet transcendent insights?  
That is to say, does environmental law illuminate any “lessons for law 
generally”?208  I believe it does, and in particular that the idea of pervasive 
interrelatedness, which is so important to environmental law’s task of 
managing the natural environment, is a concept that has important and far-
reaching implications for the law generally as well. 
We have seen that pervasive interrelatedness is a fundamental 
characteristic of the environmental context, absolutely crucial to 
understanding environmental problems.209  Pervasive interrelatedness is 
distinctive to environmental law, but also transcendent, with implications 
throughout the law in ways that already are being recognized. 
Pervasive interrelatedness is distinctive but not unique to 
environmental law.  Environmental law is inherently closely linked to 
ecology, the science of the environment, by virtue of their mutual focus on 
the environment.  Because ecology forms the basis for our understanding of 
the environment, environmental law must incorporate ecology’s insights if 
it has any hope of functioning as intended, regardless what that intent is.  
Accordingly, because pervasive interrelatedness is such a central feature of 
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the environment and a core precept of ecology, environmental law 
constantly faces the task of regulating in a context of pervasive 
interrelatedness.  Environmental law both responds to pervasive 
interrelatedness and works through pervasively interrelated mechanisms.  
Pervasive interrelationships are unavoidable in environmental law, and 
environmental law grapples with pervasive interrelatedness to a greater 
extent than other areas of law.  Indeed, western law has exhibited a strong 
tradition of attempting to limit the scope of the interrelationships it 
considers—for example, by limiting liability through the application of 
proximate cause—and environmental law can be seen in some respects as 
challenging that tradition and the assumption that the law can function 
effectively without considering a broader range of interrelationships.210 
Pervasive interrelatedness of the natural environment is distinctive 
to environmental law, but pervasive interrelatedness more generally is not 
unique to the natural environment.  The experiences from environmental 
law’s application in the pervasively interrelated context of the natural 
environment have important lessons for the application of law in other 
contexts where interrelatedness is present but not as obvious.  For example, 
some of the theories and management techniques that environmental law 
and ecology have employed to deal with pervasive interrelatedness, such as 
adaptive management, complexity theory, and chaos theory,211 also show 
significant promise for application outside of environmental law.212  More 
                                                 
210 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 155, at 5 (associating environmental law with “a desire 
for broadened accountings . . . of the full consequences of human decisionmaking”). 
211 See Jonathan Z. Cannon, Adaptive Management in Superfund: Thinking Like a 
Contaminated Site, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 561 (2005); Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities 
Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 145 (2003); Joshua Secunda & Lawrence F. Susskind, ‘Improving‘ Project Xl: 
Helping Adaptive Management to Work Within EPA, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 155 
(1998-1999); Joy B. Zedler, Adaptive Management of Coastal Ecosystems Designed to 
Support Endangered Species, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 735 (1997). 
212 See, e.g., Edward S. Adams et al., At the End of Palsgraf, There Is Chaos: An 
Assessment of Proximate Cause in Light of Chaos Theory, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 507 (1998) 
(using chaos theory to analyze proximate causation in tort law); Daniel A. Farber, Dollars 
and Sense: A “New Paradigm” for Campaign Finance Reform?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 979, 
995-1007 (2003) (advocating the application of adaptive management to campaign finance 
reform); Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 
DUKE L.J. 913 (2005) (applying complexity theory, an in particular the concept of 
adaptation, to administrative law questions); Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice 
Paradox, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 329 (1993) (drawing on chaos theory to analyze the 
competing goals of accomplishing justice between the parties to a particular dispute and 
appropriately regulating the conduct of other parties likely to have similar disputes in the 
future); Guanghua Yu, Chaos Theory and Path Dependence: The Takeover of Listed 
Companies,  20 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 217 (2005) (analyzing China's importation of an 
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generally, the concept of pervasive interrelatedness highlights how dividing 
the law into insular sub-fields obscures important interrelationships among 
different areas of the law and supports an agenda of aggressively pursuing 
integration of legal doctrine and theory across legal fields. 
CONCLUSION 
Environmental law cannot be reduced to a set of fundamental 
unifying legal principles.  Rather, the dominant characteristic of 
environmental lawmaking has been ad hoc muddling through, and this is 
reflected in the complexity and diversity of environmental law doctrine.  
But this apparent doctrinal incoherence does not mean that environmental 
law lacks a conceptual core or that it is not a legal field.  An area of law is a 
legal field if it exhibits patterns associated with common and distinctive 
features that predominate within the area to an extent that justifies studying 
the area as a distinct category of legal situations.  We can cohere an area of 
law into a field by employing an organizational framework to highlight the 
distinctive patterns associated with the field. 
Applying this methodology to environmental law, environmental 
law as a legal field is best understood conceptually as a category of 
situations that involve physical public resources subject to numerous, 
pervasively interrelated uses.  Conflicts among these uses are inevitable, 
and create tradeoffs.  These use-conflict tradeoffs define the choices facing 
environmental lawmaking institutions.   
This use-conflict framework for environmental law is superior to 
other explanations of environmental law because it focuses on features that 
are common and distinctive to environmental law and that explain the 
fundamental difficulties of lawmaking in the environmental context.  It does 
so, moreover, with a relatively value-neutral approach.  Unlike explanations 
of environmental law that are tethered to environmentalism, market 
capitalism, or other ideological commitments, the use-conflict framework 
does not assume any particular baseline by which to judge alternative 
options and does not favor any particular use of the environment as 
normatively superior.  By thus adopting a relatively value-neutral approach, 
the use-conflict framework facilitates critical analysis of a full range of 
alternatives. 
                                                                                                                            
English-style corporate takeover law as an application of chaos and path dependence 
theory). 
